Florida Law Review
Volume 9

Issue 4

Article 2

December 1956

Conflict of Laws in Estate Plannning
Eugene F. Scoles

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Eugene F. Scoles, Conflict of Laws in Estate Plannning, 9 Fla. L. Rev. 398 (1956).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol9/iss4/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Scoles: Conflict of Laws in Estate Plannning

DATE DOWNLOADED: Thu Sep 8 16:04:34 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Eugene F. Scoles, Estate Planning-a Symposium-Conflict of Laws in Estate Planning, 9
U. FLA. L. REV. 398 (1956).
ALWD 7th ed.
Eugene F. Scoles, Estate Planning-a Symposium-Conflict of Laws in Estate Planning, 9
U. Fla. L. Rev. 398 (1956).
APA 7th ed.
Scoles, E. F. (1956). Estate planning-a symposium-conflict of laws in estate
planning. University of Florida Law Review, 9(4), 398-441.
Chicago 17th ed.
Eugene F. Scoles, "Estate Planning-a Symposium-Conflict of Laws in Estate Planning,"
University of Florida Law Review 9, no. 4 (Winter 1956): 398-441
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Eugene F. Scoles, "Estate Planning-a Symposium-Conflict of Laws in Estate Planning"
(1956) 9:4 U Fla L Rev 398.
AGLC 4th ed.
Eugene F. Scoles, 'Estate Planning-a Symposium-Conflict of Laws in Estate Planning'
(1956) 9(4) University of Florida Law Review 398
MLA 9th ed.
Scoles, Eugene F. "Estate Planning-a Symposium-Conflict of Laws in Estate Planning."
University of Florida Law Review, vol. 9, no. 4, Winter 1956, pp. 398-441.
HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Eugene F. Scoles, 'Estate Planning-a Symposium-Conflict of Laws in Estate Planning'
(1956) 9 U Fla L Rev 398
Provided by:
University of Florida / Lawton Chiles Legal Information Center
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1956

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 4 [1956], Art. 2

CONFLICT OF LAWS IN ESTATE PLANNING
EUGENE F. ScoLEs*

The usual objective of an estate plan is to so arrange the disposition
of an individual's assets as to obtain the nearest possible satisfaction of
the ends desired with the least possible cost. The mobility of people
and property in our society makes it necessary for the estate planner
to consider the conflict of laws problems in nearly every estate plan
that passes through his office. If these problems are undetected or
ignored, the resulting distortion of the dispositive scheme may substantially defeat the estate owner's desires. For example, multiple administrations in different states often result in a transfer cost even
greater than the taxes with which much present-day planning is over
concerned. In view of the ever growing number of retired persons
in a population that is already less than half native born' and the
many persons in the state having residences here and elsewhere, the
Florida practitioner certainly cannot ignore the significance of conflict of laws.
Since intensive treatment of all areas of conflict of laws relating to
estate planning would be impossible within the scope of a single article,
only a few of the more significant problems will be treated. Considerable knowledge of conflict of laws on the part of the reader will
be assumed, and the article will necessarily only refresh his recollection of the usual approaches to the general area so as to assure a common ground for analysis and comment. Although interstate problems
will be dealt with primarily, the international problems should not
be minimized. As Florida grows in its standing as an international
resort area and a point of entry into the United States, problems of
private international law will become more common to the Florida
lawyer.
In the Anglo-American system of law there are dual rules of conflict of laws relating to property, one in regard to immovable assets
and one in regard to movable assets. Consequently, at the outset of a
decision on conflict of laws the forum must characterize the assets in
question as either movables or immovables for the purpose of de*A.B., J.D. 1945, University of Iowa; LL.M. 1949, Harvard University; JS.D.
1955, Columbia University.
'See US. CENSUS (1950).

[398]
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termining the applicable conflict of laws rules. The local or internal
law of a state is usually concerned only with the distinctions between
real and personal property for the purposes of administration and
descent and distribution. This distinction should be compared with
the classification of immovables and movables used in discussing conflict of laws problems. Even though "immovables" relate to interests
in land and "real property" covers generally the same subjects, the
distinction is worth while because it avoids confusion in that twilight area in which different characterizations may be made in different situations. For example, a leasehold may be considered an immovable for the purpose of choosing the applicable law but be considered personal property within the operation of the law so chosen.2
Likewise, land subject to a direction to sell or a contract to sell may
be characterized as an immovable to determine the governing law but
thereafter be considered as personal property for purposes of local
law application.: This dichotomy enables the reader to more nearly
understand the situation in which there is one characterization for
the purpose of conflict of laws and another for descent and distribution.
Although the problem of characterization must originally be made by
the forum in which the case arises, it seems settled that, in the absence
of considerations of res judicata, the characterization will finally be
determined by the situs of the land in which an interest is claimed. 4
PART I - DISPOSITIVE PROBLEMS
ITER Vivos TRANSFERS

Gifts
Questions concerning the effect of a purported gift of an immovable,
for example, land, will probably come before the court of the situs
of the land. In such event the forum would apply its own law to
determine questions of validity and construction of the purported
2Duncan v. Lawson, 41 Ch. D. 394 (1889). But cf. Craig v. Craig, 140 Md. 822,
117 Adt. 756 (1922); Despard v. Churchill, 58 N.Y. 192 (1873).
-Equitable Trust Co. v. Ward, 29 Del. Ch. 206, 48 A.2d 519 (Ch. 1946); Toledo
Soc'y for Crippled Children v. Hickok, 152 Tex. 578, 261 S.W.2d 692 (1953); In re
Burke, [1928] 10 L.R. 318; In re Berchtold, [1928] 1 Ch. 192. But cf. Planson v.
Scott, 26 Ohio App. 122, 158 N.E. 588 (1927); 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1138 (1954).
-'Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900); Norris v. Loyd, 183 Iowa 1056, 168 N.W.
557 (1918); Paul's Estate, 303 Pa. 330, 154 Adt. 503 (1931).
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transfer. 5 Thus the deed should conform to the laws of that state. By
statute, however, some states recognize the validity of a deed of land0
within their borders if it satisfies the law of the place of execution.
The effect of a gratuitous transfer of land would be governed by the
same law, that is, the situs, even though the question should come up
in the courts of a nonsitus state as forum, since the rule that the law
of the situs determines the validity of an inter vivos transfer of land
7
is one of the most stable rules in conflict of laws. For example, if a
deed executed in Y to land in X is brought into question in the
courts of F, the F court will look to the law of the situs, X. In the
usual situation the internal law requirements of state X will govern.
If, however, X has a statute declaring deeds to X land valid if valid
by the law of the place of execution, F will sustain the deed if it
satisfies the law of Y, since the law of X would be applied by the
8
courts of that state if the same case were before them.
Gratuitous inter vivos transfers of movables, for example, chattels,
raise more difficult problems than transfers of immovables. At early
common law the maxim that "movables follow the person" required
application of the law of the donor's domicile to inter vivos transfers
of chattels. 9 This view is no longer followed; today the courts apply
the law of the location or situs of the chattels at the time of thd
transfer.' 0
5CIark v. Graham, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 577 (1821); United States v. Crosby, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 115 (1812); Connor v. Elliott, 79 Fla. 513, 85 So. 164 (1920); Thompson
v. Kyle, 39 Fla. 582, 23 So. 12 (1897); Robinson v. Queen, 87 Tenn. 445, 11 S.W. 38
(1889).
6E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §7087 (1949); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 30, §§19-21 (1955);
MICH. STAT. ANN. §26.528 (1958); OHIO REV. CODE §5301.06 (1954); Wis. STAT.
§235.23 (1955); cf. FLA. STAT. §695.03 (1955).
7See McGoon v. Scales, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 23 (1869); Thompson v. Kyle, supra
note 5; STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS §428 (5th ed. 1857); Cook, 'Immovables' and the
"Law' of the 'Situs,' 52 HARV. L. REv. 1246 (1939); Goodrich, Two States and Real
Estate, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 417 (1941); Lorenzen, The Validity of Wills, Deeds and
Contracts As Regards Form in the Conflict of Laws, 20 YALE L.J. 427 (1911).
8See 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws §8.1 (1935); DiCEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 59 (6th
ed. 1949); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWs §8

(1934).

9

See Whitney v. Dodge, 105 Cal. 192, 38 Pac. 636 (1892); Nichols v. Mase, 94 N.Y.
160 (1883); Loftus v. F. & M. N. Bank, 133 Pa. 97, 19 At. 347 (1890); CIIESHIRE,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 559 (3d ed. 1947); STORY, supra note 7, at 379-80, 390.
10Warner v. Florida Bank and Trust Co., 160 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1947); Banque de
France v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 60 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1932); O'Neil v. O'Neil, 43 Mont.
505, 117 Pac. 889 (1911); Goetschius v. Brightman, 245 N.Y. 186, 156 N.E. 660
(1927); In re Korvine's Trust, [1921] 1 Ch. 343; Cammell v. Sewell, 5 H. & N. 728,
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Although the conflict of laws rule is quite simple, its application
in cases involving intangibles is complicated by two factors. First,
many intangibles involve some contractual rights, and there is the
initial question whether this interest is to be treated as a contract or
a property interest. If treated as a contract interest, contract assignment rules apply. Within the United States the assignability of the
interest in a contract is determined by the law governing the original
contract,11 while the validity of the assignment itself is tested by the
law of ie place where the assignment is made.'12 Fortunately, most of
the interests of a contractual nature that make up intangible assets
are interests in which the obligation is represented by a document
that passes from hand to hand much as if it were a chattel. These
chattelized contract interests, such as negotiable instruments and
negotiable documents of title, are treated as if they were chattels; and
at the time of transthe law of the situs of the document or instrument
3
fer determines the validity of the transfer.
The problem of transfer of corporate shares is the same in principle,
although some problems exist in practice. All of the states have adop4
ted the Uniform Stock Transfer Act,' which treats the certificate

as the property interest itself rather than merely evidence of property. Clearly, since the act intends to chattelize the certificate, the
5
location of the certificate should determine the applicable law.'
This result is to be expected, but it is arrived at by the courts by a
somewhat circuitous route. Traditionally the transfer of corporate
shares has been governed by the law of the place of incorporation of
the company.'- This rule still stands; but, since all states of incorporation now determine the validity of a transfer by the situs of the certificates at the time of transfer, the ultimate governing law by recog157 Eng. Rep. 1371 (1860).

But cf. Gidden v. Gidden, 176 Miss. 98, 167 So. 785

(1936).

"iColeman v. American Sheet and Tin Plate Co., 285 Ill. App. 542, 2 N.E.2d 349
(1936); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 155 Wis. 335, 144 N.W. 1108

(1914).

l1Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Wayne County Say. Bank, 68 Mich. 116, 35 N.W.
853 (1888); Spencer v. Myers, 150 N.Y. 269, 44 N.E. 942 (1896).
"3United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 293 U.S. 340 (1934); Weissman v. Banque
de Bruxelles, 254 N.Y. 488, 173 N.E. 835 (1930); Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank,
[1905] 1 K.B. 677.
'46 U.L.A. 6 (Supp. 1955).
ISSee Peters, Conflict of Laws Problems Concerning the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act, 41 IowA L. Riv. 414 (1956).
16jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U.S. 1 (1900).
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nition of this reference is the situs of the stock certificate.1 7 The problem becomes significant only when the Uniform Stock Transfer Act
does not apply, for example, when the act covers only stock issued
since its adoption. 8 In that event the local law of the state of incorporation may apply to the shares issued before passage of the act.
Within this limited exception the statutory provision of the Florida
Stock Transfer Act' 9 is of doubtful effect, since it provides that the
transfer shall be effective when the certificate is within the state,
whether the shares are in local or foreign corporations. There may
well be a serious question as to whether a state of incorporation would
be required to recognize the Florida transfer of a certificate if the state
of incorporation did not chattelize the interest in the certificate.
Certainly the weight of authority before the general adoption of the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act would recognize only the transfer at the
place of incorporation.2 0 In view of the general adoption of the act,
however, this problem will shortly become academic. 21
The above instances represent the principal deviations; the authorities clearly indicate that the validity of a gift of either tangibles or
intangibles will in most instances be governed by the law of the situs
of the subject matter at the time of the gift, that is, at the time of an
effective delivery of the subject matter or instrument of gift.
Trusts and Future Interests
a. Immovables
Inter vivos trusts of immovables fall within the traditional situs
rule as to governing law.22 Consequently, since title questions usually
arise only at the situs, the situs court usually applies its own law to
'7Direction der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp., 267 U.S. 22
(1925); Simpson v. Jersey City Contracting Co., 165 N.Y. 193, 58 N.E. 896 (1900);
Mills v. Jacobs, 333 Pa. 231, 4 A.2d 152 (1939).
1sU.S.T.A. §23, 6 U.LA. 27 (1922). But cf. FLA. STAT. §614.24 (1955).
i9FLA. STAT. §614.24 (1955).
20Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 594 (1917); Jellenik v. Huron Mining
Co., 177 U.S. 1 (1900).
21It is possible that an alternative reference may develop to sustain an effective

transfer of shares, i.e., transfer will be effective if valid either by law of place of
certificate or place of incorporation; see Morson v. Second Nat'l Bank, 306 Mass. 588,

29 N.E.2d 19 (1940).
22Acker v. Priest, 92 Iowa 610, 61 N.W. 235 (1894); Peabody v. Kent, 153 App.
Div. 286, 138 N.Y. Supp. 32 (2d Dep't 1912), aff'd, 213 N.Y. 154, 107 N.E. 51 (1914).
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determine the validity of the transfer and the extent or nature of the
interests of the parties. Inasmuch as the creation of a trust of land is
a gratuitous transfer as between grantor-settlor and grantee-trustee,
the foregoing discussion of gifts is applicable in most instances to
transfers in trust.23 In this connection the law of the situs to be applied by a neutral forum includes any applicable conflict of laws
rule of the situs.24
One of the complicated problems in trusts of immovables concerns
a direction to sell or to purchase land in different states. Since the
direction to buy or sell is a provision commonly encountered in estate
planning, the planner should be aware of the problems that may arise.
Like most problems in conflict of laws, the outcome of the case often
depends upon the particular question of validity involved. For example, the law of the situs of the land should govern if the issue is
the capacity of the settlor to make the grant or if a question of due
execution of the deed of land in trust for sale is raised. 25 When validity
is doubted because of undue suspension of alienation or undue accumulation of income, however, the policies of the state in which property
is held for long periods are involved, and the law of that state should
decide the question. 20 Thus, if land in state X is transferred to trustees
for sale and reinvestment in land or movables in state Y, the formalities of the transaction should be governed by the law of X, while
questions as to the Rule Against Perpetuities should be determined
by the law of Y. In this way the law of each state decides those questions with which it is most concerned.
A related but separate problem arises when the trustee is not required to convert but may do so under his powers of sale and investment. If the trust is valid under the initial governing law, the purchase
of an immovable in another state should not adversely affect its
essential validity. 27 The only question should go to the propriety of
23See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
24See note 8 supra and accompanying text.

25See Peabody v. Kent, supra note 22; LAND, TRUSTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
29 (1940); Stumberg, Testamentary Dispositions and the Conflict of Laws, 34 TEx.
L. REV. 28, 32 (1955); Note, 32 COLUm. L. Rxv. 680 (1932).
2GCf. In the Matter of Chappell, 124 Wash. 128, 213 Pac. 684 (1923). But cf.
LAND, TRUSTS AND CONFLICT OF LAWS 30 (1940).
27Fisk's Appeal, 81 Conn. 433, 71 At. 559 (1908); Acker v. Priest, 92 Iowa 610,
61 N.W. 235 (1894); Bishop v. Bishop, 258 N.Y. 216, 179 N.E. 391 (1932); Matter of
Bradford, 165 Misc. 736, 1 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Surr. Ct. 1937); see RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
OF LAWS §242 (1934). Courts do not always indicate their awareness of these problems; see Waterbury v. Munn, 159 Fla. 754, 32 So.2d 603 (1947).
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28
the particular investment by the trustee.
The approach indicated above is not always taken as to trusts with
a direction to convert; many courts view the mandatory direction as
9
effecting a change of governing law for all purposes.2 This of course
suggests that no direction to sell or to buy property in a particular state
should be included in an estate plan unless the possible ramifications
have been thoroughly explored in both jurisdictions. After investigation, however, it may be that the draftsman will find that the conflicts rules of the particular states involved afford means of achieving
greater compliance with the wishes of the estate owner. 30 An interesting example of this arose in probating the estate of Marshall Field,
31
whose will covered immovables located in several states. One clause
provided that, if the terms of the trust were invalid under the laws
of any state, the land located therein was to be sold and the proceeds
held under the terms of the testamentary trust, which was governed
by different laws.
The use of nonmandatory and hence nonconverting investment
authorizations to the trustee also affords a means of gaining the advantages of investment in another state that would deny the validity
of the trust if originally created within that state or if a direction to
invest in immovables were to be included therein.
Problems relating to future interests of immovables most often
arise in cases involving trusts; and, like trusts and gifts of immovables,
the problems of validity, extent, and nature of the future interest, as
32
well as its destructibility or construction, are controlled by the situs.

The same reference to the situs of immovables has developed in the
cases concerning powers of appointment. 33 Illustrative of the usual rule
2SMcCullough's Ex'rs v. McCullough, 44 N.J. Eq. 313, 14 AtI. 123 (Ch. 1888);
Ormiston v. Oleatt, 84 N.Y. 339 (1881).

29Ford v. Ford, 80 Mich. 42, 44 N.W. 1057 (1890); Jenkins v. Guarantee Trust and
Safe Deposit Co., 53 N.J. Eq. 194, 32 AtI. 208 (Ct. Err. &App. 1895); Mount v. Tuttle,
183 N.Y. 358, 76 N.E. 873 (1906); Bible Soc'y v. Pendleton, 7 W. Va. 79 (1873). This
approach is approved and considered the majority view in LAND, TRUSTS IN THE
CONFLICT OF LAws 30 (1940); Note, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1138 (1954). Cf. 2 BEALE,
CONFLICt oF LAws

§240.3 (1935).

36 (1940).
siMerchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Trust Co., 250 Ill. 86, 95 N.E. 59
(1911).
3OSee

LAND, TRUSTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS

32RMSTATEMENT, CONFLICr OF LAws

§§214-22 (1934).

33Ligget v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co., 274 Ky. 387, 118 S.W.2d 720 (1938);
Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 126 N.E. 461 (1920); Russell v. Joys, 227 Mass.
263, 116 N.E. 549 (1917); Sewall v. Wilmer, 132 Mass. 131 (1882); In the Matter of
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is a New York case 34 involving Florida and Pennsylvania land, in
which the appointment by the donee was treated as invalid in New
York, the domicile of the donee, but valid by the law of the situs of the
land in question. In sustaining the exercise of the power the court
stated: 35

"... I find that the law of that State [Florida] is applicable to
this question with respect to the Florida real estate ....
The
trust fund now before the court contains an undivided interest
in Pittsburgh, Pa., real estate, and I find that the law of that
State is applicable thereto."
It should be borne in mind that the determinative law is that indicated at the creation of the power; consequently, when the power
to appoint is contained in a trust, a subsequent sale and conversion to

movable property does not change the governing

law.36

The law governing trusts and powers of appointment of immovables is in a state of active growth. In the area of trusts generally the
autonomy of the settlor in choosing the governing law is developing

rapidly. 37 Although still usually limited to trusts of movables, evolution of this autonomy is to be anticipated in the area of immovables as
well, particularly through development of the concept of trustee ownership of interests in land as ordinary investments subject to change.
Powers of appointment, long characterized as devices whereby the
donor's property is directed to a recipient by the donor's agent,38 have
Kelly, 161 Misc. 255, 291 N.Y. Supp. 860 (Sun.. Ct. 1936); Lawrence's Estate, 136
Pa. 354, 20 At. 521 (1890); Blount v. Walker, 28 S.C. 545, 6 S.E. 558 (1888); Miller
v. Douglass, 192 Wis. 486, 213 N.V. 320 (1927); see 3 Pow.L, REAL PROPERTY §397
(1952); RSTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §234 (1934); Mulford, The Conflict of
Laws and Powers of Appointment, 87 U. PA. L. Rzv. 403 (1939).
3
41n the Matter of Kelly, 161 Misc. 255, 291 N.Y. Supp. 860 (Sui-. Ct. 1936).
-5Id. at 257, 291 N.Y. Supp. at 862.
- 0In the Matter of Sloan, 7 Cal. App.2d 319, 46 P.2d 1007 (1935); Greenough v.
Osgood, supra note 33; Russell v. Joys, supra note 33. But cf. Wilmington Trust Co.
v. Wilmington Trust Co., 26 Del. Ch. 397, 24 A.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Bible Soc'y
v. Pendleton, 7 W. Va. 79 (1873).
37Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., supra note 36; Amerige v.
Attorney-General, 324 Mass. 648, 88 N.E.2d 126 (1949); Chase Nat'l Bank v. Central
Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 265 App. Div. 434, 39 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1st Dep't 1943);
In the Matter of Chappell, 24 Wash. 128, 213 Pac. 684 (1923).
3SWilmington Trust Co. v. Sloane, 30 Del. Ch. 103, 54 A.2d 544 (Ch. 1947);
Pitman v. Pitman, 314 Mass. 465, 50 N.E.2d 69 (1943); Harlow v. Duryea, 42 R.I.
234, 107 Atl. 98 (1919).
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shown exceedingly rapid development under the impact of the federal
estate tax.39
As the courts cut through the often outmoded concepts of an
earlier time, greater emphasis will probably be placed upon the intention of the donor-settlor and upon the circumstances under which
the donee is acting at the time of exercise. 40 As the law stands now,
however, the law of the situs of immovables is rather rigidly applied.
A possible planning technique that would give choice of controlling
law to the settlor of land in a state whose law is unfavorable is to create
an inter vivos trust of movables, with administration in a state whose
law is sympathetic to the settlor's desires, and permit the trustee to
purchase the land in question as an investment.
b. Movables
Trusts of movables, tangible or intangible, are usually the most
flexible devices available for carrying out the wishes of an estate
owner - at least as far as problems of conflict of laws are concerned.
Since future interests in movables are nearly always created in the
form of trusts, the problems in both trusts and future interests will
be discussed concurrently. Although the issues under consideration
may arise in almost any court, they usually arise either at the domicile
of the settlor or that of the trustee, probably more often at the latter.
It will be the conflict of laws of one of these states that will be in
question in most instances.
The gratuitous transfer in trust is of course a gift as far as the
transfer itself is concerned. The usual rules relating to gifts apply
to trusts, so that the situs of the asset transferred at the time of the
creation of the trust controls its validity.41 The leading case is Hutchison v. Ross,4 2 in which the settlor was domiciled in Quebec, where
he signed a trust agreement that was sent to New York. There the
trustee signed it and received delivery of certain securities subject
39Casner, Estate Planning-Powers of Appointment, 64 HAxv. L. REv. 185 (1950);
Craven, Powers of Appointment Act of 1951, 65 HARv. L. REv. 55 (1951); Lauritzen,
DraftingPowers of Appointment Under the 1951 Act, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 314 (1952);
see also Brown and Brown, Uses of Powers of Appointment in Iowa Estate Planning
Under Current Tax Law, 40 IowA L. REv. 607 (1955); Freeman, If This Be Simplification, 40 CoRuELL L.Q. 500 (1955).
4OSee Durand, Which State's Law Governs Exercise of Power of Appointment, 95
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 424 (1956); 50 COLUM. L. REv. 239 (1950).
42See note 10 supra.
42262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65 (1933).
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to the trust. The trust was administered in New York, where it was
later attacked on the basis of invalidity under the law of Quebec. The
New York court recognized that it was "dealing with a conveyance
in trust of documents which in the market-place are treated as property and not merely evidence of property . . . ."4 After discussing the
various contacts that different jurisdictions had with the case, the court
concluded that "the validity of a trust of personal property must be
determined by the law of this State, when the property is situated here
and the parties intended that it should be administered here in accordance with the laws of this State." 44
The controlling factors in the case were the situs of the movables
and the intention of the settlor. Since these assets can be moved at will,
particularly intangibles in the form of documents, the ease with which
a favorable governing law based on location can be provided is apparent. The other factor of moving consideration for the New York
court was the settlor's intention relating to governing law. In the trust
area the intention factor is fast becoming the most significant of all.
This is reflected in cases, most of which have been decided in New
York, that clearly set the pattern of trust litigation in other states.4
For example, in Shannon v. Irving Trust Co.4" a New Jersey settlor
created an inter vivos trust in New York, with a New York trustee, and
provided that New Jersey law was to control all questions except com13Id. at 391, 187 N.E. at 69.
441d. at 395, 187 N.E. at 71; accord, Warner v. Florida Bank & Trust Co., 160
F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1947) (applying Florida conflicts rules, court sustained a trust
established in Minnesota by Florida residents by applying Minnesota law); Liberty
Nat'l Bank &:Trust Co. v. New England Investors Shares, 25 F.2d 493 (D. Mass.
1928); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 26 Del. Ch. 397, 24 A.2d
309 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Bouree v. Trust Francais des Actions de la Francoa-Wyoming
Oil Co., 14 Del. Ch. 332, 127 Ad. 56 (Ch. 1924); Heirs of Hullin v. Faur6, 15 La.
Ann. 622* (1860); National Shawmut Bank v. Gumming, 325 Mass. 457, 91 N.E.2d
337 (1950); Russell v. Joys, 227 Mass. 263, 116 N.E. 549 (1917); Cutts v. Najdrowski,
123 N.J. Eq. 486, 198 Ad. 885 (Ct. Err. & App. 1938); Appeal of Fowler, 125 Pa.
388, 17 Atl. 431 (1889); see Miller v. Douglass, 192 Wis. 486, 213 N.W. 320 (1927);
Cavers, Trusts Inter Vivos and Conflict of Laws, 44 HARV. L. REv. 161 (1930); cf.
Beverly Beach Properties v. Nelson, 68 So.2d 604 (Fla. 1953).
4GLiberty Nat'l Bank &Trust Co. v. New England Investors Shares, Inc., 25 F.2d
493 (D. Mass. 1928); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., supra note 44;
Riggs v. Barrett, 308 Ill. App. 671, 32 N.E.2d 392 (1941); Amerige v. Attorney
General, 324 Mass. 648, 88 N.E.2d 126 (1949); Russell v. Joys, supra note 44; Shannon
v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N.Y. 95, 9 N.E.2d 792 (1937); see N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW
§12a; R.I. ACTS AND RESOLVES C.977 (1941). But cf. Clark v. Baker, 186 Ga. 65, 196 S.E.
750 (1938).
46275 N.Y. 95, 9 N.E.2d 792 (1937).
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pensation. The trust provided for an accumulation of income valid
in New Jersey but invalid in New York. The New York court, in
sustaining the trust by applying New Jersey law, stated: "The instrument should be construed and a determination of its validity made
according to the law chosen by the settlor unless so to do is contrary
to the public policy of the state." 47
The settlor of an inter vivos trust of movables does not have complete autonomy in the matter of selecting the governing law; the law
chosen must bear some reasonable relationship to the trust transaction. 41 This perhaps means that the courts are looking for the state
having the most significant contacts, but with intent as the factor given
the most weight. The intention factor is particularly significant in
that whenever possible the courts sustain the trust.
The use of intent and situs factors in choice of law in trust cases
has not only provided effective selection of governing law at the
creation of a trust but also makes it possible to change the governing
law after the trust is created. The cases on this point are few,49 with
the leading case of Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co."
permitting the governing law of a trust to be changed from New York
to Delaware by reason of the appointment of a successor trustee. Direction in the instrument was interpreted to effectuate such a change
upon the naming of a successor trustee in a different state. It seems
clear that if an effective change of governing law is to be made after
creation of the trust it must be through operation of the settlor's intention, clearly expressed, and must operate prospectively only and
have no retroactive validating effect.
The point at issue in the Wilmington Trust case was the validity
of the exercise of a power of appointment as against a "Rule Against
Perpetuities" objection, the appointment being sustained under the
Delaware law. This case, standing alone, illustrates the related
nature of trusts and powers of appointment. Taken with other cases
it indicates that powers of appointment are probably closely akin to
102, 9 N.E.2d at 794.
48City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cheek, 202 Misc. 303, 110 N.Y.S.2d 434 (Sup. Ct.
(1952).
49Wilmington Trust Co. v. Sloane, 30 Del. Ch. 103, 54 A.2d 544 (Ch. 1947);
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 26 Del. Ch. 397, 24 A.2d 309 (Sup.
Ct. 1952); Application of New York Trust Co., 195 Misc. 598, 87 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup.
Ct. 1949); cf. Curtis v. Curtis, 185 App. Div. 391, 173 N.Y. Supp. 103 (1st Dep't
1918). But cf. LAND, TRUSTS IN THE CONFLICt OF LAws 124-80 (1940).
5026 Del. Ch. 397, 24 A.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
471d. at
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trusts for conflicts purposes.51 The ancient agent-of-the-donor concept
in powers of appointment leads the courts to apply the law governing
the creation of the power. 52 This largely ignores the circumstances
in which the donee of the power acts. In the case of the general
power of appointment the donee's interest is treated as ownership
for some purposes in some states.5 3 This may very well cause a serious
problem when one of the states involved has a different rule from the
other.54 Clearly, if the estate of the client includes assets in different
states, the device of the inter vivos trust permits a most flexible approach to planning. It is imperative that an estate planner make a
complete analysis of the conflicts question as well as the internal law
matters when powers of appointment are involved or are to be employed. Full use of express choice of law clauses can well enable an
attorney to effect a desirable plan that would be frustrated by application of internal law rules alone. 55
ContractualTransactions
Contracts. The area of contracts in conflict of laws has long been
confused by an apparent multiplicity of choice of law rules.5 The
-iParticularly in regard to the importance of the element of the donor's intention; see Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 126 N.E. 461 (1920); Chase Nat'l Bank
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 265 App. Div. 434, 39 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1st
Dep't 1943); Harlow v. Duryea, 42 R.I. 234, 107 At. 98 (1919).
52Wilmington Trust Co. v. Sloane, supra note 49; Sewall v. Wilmer, 132 Mass. 131
(1882); Harlow v. Duryea, supra note 51.
3For example, in some jurisdictions the creditors of the donee can reach the
power, even though exercised in favor of another. McMurtry v. State, 111 Conn. 594,
151 Ad. 252 (1930).
54See Durand, supra note 40.
55An illustrative clause is: "The validity, construction, effect and administration
of this agreement shall be governed and determined under the laws of the State of
." LAND, TRUSTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 124 (1940). Also, "The
trust hereby created shall be deemed to be a Georgia trust and shall be, in all
respects, governed by the laws of the State of Georgia so long as the original trustee
herein named acts as such trustee, but in the event of a change of Trustee, as
hereinabove provided, shall thereafter be deemed to be a trust under, and shall
thereafter, in all respects, be governed by, the laws of the state or country in which
said substituted Trustee has its domicile or principal place of business, and in that
event all of the trust funds and property shall be removed to said state or country.
The entire trust property shall at all times be held and administered by the then
Trustee in the state or country in which such Trustee has its domicile or principal
place of business." BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRusrEns 131 (1955).
5OBEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1077 (1935); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 321 (3d ed.
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confusion has stemmed to some extent from failure to appreciate the
fact that the laws of different states may govern different matters under
the same contract. Although the rule that the place of making governs
the validity of a contract is often repeated, 57 it has probably been most
often limited to problems of capacity and matters of form.58 The
authorities are split, however, even on this use of the place-of-making
rule.59 At the same time, problems concerning excuses for nonperformance and the like have most often been governed in the
United States by the law of the place of performance.0 Most of the
courts applying either of these two rules usually bolster their decisions
with language indicating that the chosen law is that of the state intended, or presumably intended, by the parties to govern.0 ' Consequently, there has developed considerable authority that the parties
can choose the law applicable to their contract. 2 Particularly significant are the courts' attempts to use this approach to sustain the contract
if at all possible. 63 Often this autonomy is denied,(, but here again
there may be an explanation for the results reached. State laws,
common or statutory, relating to contracts are of two kinds: (1) mandatory or regulatory, such as those requiring consideration and those
prohibiting gambling contracts; and (2) permissive or intention sup1949); STUMBERG, CONFLICr OF LAWS 226 (1951); see, e.g., Jones v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 158 Misc. 466, 286 N.Y. Supp. 4 (Ist Dep't 1936).
57Scudder v. Union Nat'l Bank, 91 U.S. 406 (1875); Conner v. Elliott, 79 Fla.
513, 85 So. 164 (1920); Thompson v. Kyle, 39 Fla. 582, 23 So. 12 (1897); Forsyth v.
Barnes, 228 Ill. 326, 81 N.E. 1028 (1907); Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 28 Am.
Rep. 271 (1878); Berger-Crittenden Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ky., 159 Wis. 256,
150 N.E. 496 (1915).
5S8Freeman's Appeal, 68 Conn. 533, 37 At. 420 (1897); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v.
Long, 94 Fla. 547, 114 So. 239 (1927); Conner v. Elliott, supra note 57; Milliken
v. Pratt, supra note 57; Forsyth v. Barnes, supra note 57.
59Greenlee v. Hardin, 157 Miss. 229, 127 So. 777 (1930); see Davenport v. Karnes,
70 Ill. 465 (1873); Poole v. Perkins, 126 Va. 331, 101 S.E. 240 (1919).
GOLouis-Dreyfus v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 43 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1930); Union Nat'l
Bank v. Chapman, 169 N.Y. 538, 62 N.E. 672 (1902).
6OPritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (1882).
62Seeman v. Philadelphia Whse. Co., 274 US. 403 (1927); Duskin v. PennsylvaniaCentral Airlines Corp., 167 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1948); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Film
Classics, Inc., 156 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1946); see Cook, 'Contracts' and Conflict of Laws:
'Intention"of Parties, 32 ILL. L. Rav. 899 (1939).
6
3Pritchard v. Norton, 106 U.S. 124 (1882); Green v. Northwestern Trust Co.,
128 Minn. 30, 150 N.W. 229 (1914); see Seeman v. Philadelphia Whse. Co., 274 U.S.
403 (1927); Grand v. Livingston, 4 App. Div. 589, 38 N.Y. Supp. 490 (4th Dep't 1896).
64E. Gerli & CO. v. Cunard S. S. CO., 48 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1931).
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plying, such as those that create presumptions relating to certain
sales agreements or promissory notes, which apply only in the absence
of an expressed intention to the contrary.
Parties cannot lift themselves by their bootstraps and simply say
that the law of some distant state shall apply because it permits what
local law prohibits; but they can replace many of the legal presumptions with evidence of their intention, expressed in writing or incorporated by reference. It is therefore submitted that the parties can
without limitation choose their law when the matter involved is in
the permissive classification. 5 The courts have also indicated that,
when the contacts or connections that a transaction has with two
different states are fairly evenly divided and substantial, the parties
may choose the law, even of a regulatory nature, of either state to
govern-unless some act is required to be performed in a state in
which it is illegal or otherwise violently opposed to local public
policy.66
In viewing the confusion of the rules in the contracts area, some
courts67 and several writers6s have quite frankly said that the method
of determining the governing law has in fact been, and should be, to
weigh all of the contacts that each state has with the transaction, apply
the law of that state whose connection to the contract matter in
question is most substantial, and recognize that the intention of the
parties is an important factor.
This goes to indicate that in planning contract aspects of the multistate estate the attorney must recognize that the conflict of laws rules
are subject to considerable uncertainty and that they are different
from those applied to trusts and estates. This requires increased care
in their use.
Insurance. Life insurance performs functions that involve both
65See E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S. S. Co., supra note 64; Cheatham, Book Review,
48 CO.uL. L. REv. 1267 (1948). But cf. Owens v. Hagenbeck-Wallace Shows Co.,
58 R.I. 162, 192 At. 158 (1937).
66See note 62 supra; Brierley v. Commercial Credit Co., 43 F.2d 724 (E.D. Pa.
1929), aff'd, 43 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1930).
67W. H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 570, 63 N.E.2d 417 (1945); Spahr v. P.
& H. Supply Co., 223 Ind. 591, 63 N.E.2d 425 (1945); Jones v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 158 Misc. 466, 286 N.Y. Supp. 4 (Ist Dep't 1936).
6SCHESHMIE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 311 (3d ed. 1947); 2 RAI EL, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 480 (1947); STUM!ERG, CONFLICT OF LAWs 238 (2d ed. 1951); Comment, 34 TEX.

L. REv. 114 (1955).
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the contract and the estate policies of a state. It is a device that
bridges the gap between contract and property disposition at death.
It is therefore to be expected that different choices of law may be
made as different problems between different parties arise.19 For example, problems relating to the validity of the contract as between
insured and insurer, such as the ability of the insurance company to
cancel the policy during the lifetime of the insured, are clearly contract
type problems. Here, then, contract concepts would be applied to
determine the governing law. In Florida, conflict of laws cases ininvolving contracts other than insurance have been traditional, the
courts preferring the place of making or performance, without any
real distinction as to when one rather than the other will be applied.70
The place-of-making concept, however, has been generally applied in
insurance cases to govern most questions that arise under a policy.71
The place of making is made definite by characterizing it as the place
where the policy is delivered. Under this approach both validity and
construction have been governed by the place where the contract
was entered into, that is, the place delivered,72 although there is
some indication that stipulations of governing law might have some
effect. 73
When the insured dies some aspects of insurance give rise to many
of the same considerations that arise in decedents' estates. The states'
policies relating to protection of the surviving spouse and the children,
or creditors, and those relating to tax matters come into play. Consequently, it is often urged that the domicile of the deceased is the
state most concerned after his death and that its laws should govern
these aspects of the insurance problems.74 Although Florida has
69Cf. Knights Templars v. Greene, 79 Fed. 461 (S.D. Ohio 1897); Expressman's
Mut. Benefit Ass'n v. Hurlock, 91 Md. 585, 46 Ati. 957 (1900); Millard v. Brayton,
177 Mass. 533, 59 N.E. 436 (1901).
7oEquitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Clements, 140 U.S. 226 (1891); In re Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 188 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1951); De Long v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins.
Co., 109 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1940); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hilton-Green, 202 Fed.
113 (5th Cir. 1913); Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. McRee, 75 Fla. 257, 78 So. 22 (1918).
7lMutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hilton-Green, supra note 70; Sovereign Camp v.
Mixon, 79 Fla. 420, 84 So. 171 (1920).
721n re Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra note 70; De Long v. Jefferson Standard Life
Ins. Co., supra note 70.
73Cf. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hilton-Green, 202 Fed. 113 (5th Cir. 1913).
T4Knights Templars v. Greene, 79 Fed. 461 (S.D. Ohio 1897); see CARNAHAN,
CONFLICT OF LAWS IN INSURANCE §14.62 (1942); Scoles, Apportionment of Federal
Estate Taxes and Conflict of Laws, 55 COLum. L. Rav. 261 (1955).
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shown extraordinary concern for the surviving members of the family
generally,75 in this area the domicile arguments have gone unheeded
and the usual contracts rule has been applied to insurance questions.
For instance, when life insurance is made payable to the estate of the
insured, a Florida statute76 causes the proceeds to pass to the surviving spouse and children rather than to the estate or the creditors.
In the conflicts area, however, the Florida Court has held this statute
inapplicable to non-Florida contracts. In Equitable Life Assurance
Society v. McRee77 the contract was issued to an Alabama resident who
later, while a resident of Georgia, changed the policy and designated
the personal representative as the beneficiary. The insured subsequently died while domiciled in Florida, and the statutory beneficiaries
claimed the proceeds as against the Florida administrator. The Court
held the statute inapplicable and gave the proceeds to the administrator. This case is some indication that the Court is willing to characterize all problems of insurance as contract matters and, perhaps in
order to achieve greater certainty, disregard the law of the insured's
domicile at death.
One matter in which Florida local policy has prevailed is the allowance of attorneys' fees to successful claimants against insurance
companies.7B Here the Court, using the well-established substance and
procedure dichotomy,79 has held that, since remedies are governed
by the forum,80 the Florida policy of discouraging companies from
contesting contracts in Florida will be applied. 81 Although the statements by the Court are without express limitation, the cases decided
thus far have pertained to insurance contracts held by persons residing
in Florida at their death. It seems likely that those claimants who
have little other reason to sue in Florida courts could well be denied
75See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§222.13, 731.27, .34, 733.20 (1955); Griley v. Griley, 43
So.2d 350 (Fla. 1949); Murphy v. Murphy, 125 Fla. 855, 170 So. 856 (1936); Henderson v. Usher, 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846 (1936).
76FA. STAT. §222.13 (1955); see Black and Scoles, Disposition of Life Insurance
Proceeds Payable to Insured's Estate, 26 FLA. L.J. 131 (1952).
7775 Fla. 257, 78 So. 22 (1918).
78FLA. STAT. §625.08 (1955).
7PSee Ailes, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 39 MICH. L. Ray.
392 (1941); Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J.
333 (1933).
8OSee Brown v. Case, 80 Fla. 703, 86 So. 684 (1920).
8'Fidelity-Phenix Fire, Ins. Co. v. Cortez .Cigar Co., 92 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1937);
Foy v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 127 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Fla. 1955); Feller v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc'y, 57 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1952).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1956

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 4 [1956], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

the benefits of the statute by an application of the doctrine of forum
non conveniens.82
An exception to the usual conflicts approach in insurance contracts,
which may or may not be significant in the planning of a particular
estate, relates to the matter of death benefits in mutual fraternal benefit associations. In Sovereign Camp v. Mixons3 it was held that the
delivery of an insurance certificate in Florida caused Florida law to
control, 8. resulting in the invalidation of a contract provision that
reduced the period of limitations. Although similar statutes have been
permitted to apply to other types of contracts, the Supreme Court of
the United States in a long line of cases 85 has held unconstitutional
their application to benefits under certificates of fraternal mutual
benefit associations when the place of organization of the association
permitted the contractual provision. These cases require that full
faith and credit be given the statutes relating to the organization of
the association and charter provisions thereunder. So far this approach
has been expressly limited to the fraternal association cases; but, as
pointed out by dissenting members of the Court,8 6 there is little doctrinal reason to preclude its application to any mutual company.
Sovereign Camp v. Mixon must be considered as erroneous in light
of these subsequent developments.
Bank Accounts. Although there has been little litigation on the
matter, banks and attorneys are often bothered by the problem of who
is entitled to the proceeds of a bank account in the joint names of
the deceased and another, or in the name of the deceased as trustee for
another, or with a direction to pay to another upon death. While the
local statute 7 protects the bank, it does not always determine the out82See Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29
COLUm. L. REv. 1 (1929); Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARV. L.
REv. 908 (1947).
8379 Fla. 420, 84 So. 171 (1920).
84See FLA. STAT. §95.03 (1955).
SSE.g., Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947);
Sovereign Camp v. Bolin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938); Modern Woodmen of America v.
Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925); cf. Southern Mut. Aid Ass'n v. Cobb, 60 Fla. 198, 53
So. 505 (1910).
seOrder of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 625 (1947)
(Black, J., dissenting).
a.FLA. STAT. §659.29 (1955). All but one of the states reportedly now have similar
statutes; see Note, 53 COLUM. L. Ray. 103 (1953); see also FLA. STAT. §659.30 (1955);
Note, 53 COLUm. L. Rav. 132 (1953).
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come of litigation between the payee and the personal representative
of the original depositor.88 A significant conflicts problem arises when
the original depositor and the bank are domiciled in different states.
If characterized as a gift or inter vivos trust, the law of the location
of the bank, as the place of transfer of the intangible involved, would
seem to govern. If a contract is deemed to be in issue, probably here
again the law of the bank's location would govern, either by reason
of the place-of-making or performance doctrines. If neither of these
approaches is taken, the deposit may be viewed as an asset in the deceased depositor's estate at death and hence subject to the law of his
domicile. The litigated cases, 9 with few exceptions, 90 have applied the
law of the bank's location, though there is some confusion as to the
reasons for the result. Rather clearly the contacts center about the
bank, and commercial needs indicate that the law of the place where
the bank does business should govern. A similar analysis seems indicated in the case of bonds payable on death, profit-sharing plans,
pension plans, and the like. 91
The Buy-and-Sell Agreement. This agreement, so common in estates involving partnerships or closely held corporations, is probably
within the traditional conflicts rules relating to contracts. In using
these agreements, in order to avoid the possibility of some unforeseen
law thwarting the intention of the parties, the attorney should plan
the transaction so that the local law requirements of each state are
satisfied. The significance of the place of incorporation, the principal
place of business, the domicile of the parties, and the location of assets
should not be overlooked in this regard. If immovables, that is, land
interests, are involved, location may well be controlling. Then the
contacts subject to control by the parties should be so arranged as
to indicate the desired law, and the contract should expressly indicate
the same law as governing. If the contract is of doubtful enforceability
by reason of choice of law rules, it is advisable to set up some alternative arrangement, such as an escrow trust, to carry out the needed
program.
85E.g., Cerny v. Cerny, 152 Fla. 333, II So.2d 777 (1943); Clark v. Bridges, 163
Ga. 542, 136 S.E. 444 (1927).
89See, e.g., Cutts v. Najdrowski, 123 N.J. Eq. 481, 198 Atl. 885 (Ch. 1938); Boyle
v. Kempkin, 243 Wis. 86, 9 N.W.2d 589 (1943).
DoSee In the Matter of Weinstein's Estate, 176 Misc. 592, 28 N.Y.S.2d 137 (Surr.

Ct. 1941).
')See Notes, 53 CoLum. L. Rav. 103, 132 (1953).
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TRANSFERS AT DEATH

Intestacy
Admittedly a client seldom dies intestate after having his estate
planned; but, because intestacy is the background for all planning and
because of the possibility of intestacy by reason of revocation or defective execution, the conflicts problems of intestacies will be considered briefly. As to immovables, the usual situs rule applies, and
their descent and distribution are governed thereby. 92 The major
problem here is characterization; and, as previously indicated, this
problem arises in the area of leases, royalties on mineral rights, and
the like.93 Once, however, it is determined that an interest in land is
involved, the situs rule, including the applicable conflict rule of the
situs state, if any, will govern. 4
In all but one of the states, movables are distributed according to
the law of the domicile of the deceased at the time of his death.05
The sole exception is Mississippi, which applies local law to both
movables and immovables. 8 The general view is always subject to the
qualification that the state in which the movables are located for purposes of administration may distribute locally if the law of the domicile
is strongly contrary to its own.97 Fortunately this seldom occurs, however, since differences in policy are slight among the states.
Wills and Testamentary Trusts
a. Immovables
The traditional situs rule applies to govern the validity of a will
or of a trust of immovables created by will. 98 The situs is usually the
92See Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900); Brandeis v. Atkins, 204 Mass. 471, 90
N.E. 861 (1910); Montgomery v. Montgomery, 101 Tex. 118, 105 S.W. 38 (1907).
93Equitable Trust Co. v. Ward, 29 Del. Ch. 206, 48 A.2d 519 (Ch. 1946); Toledo
Soc'y for Crippled Children v. Hickok, 152 Tex. 578, 261 S.W.2d 692 (1953); In re
Burke, [1928] 10 L.R. 318; In re Berchtold, [1923] 1 Ch. 192.
94See 1 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS §8.1 (1935); DicEy, CONFLICT OF LAWS 59 (6th
ed. 1949); REsrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWs §8 (1934).
95See Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 (1916); Ennis v. Smith, 55 U.S. (14 How.)
400 (1852); Lawrence v. Kitteridge, 21 Conn. 577* (1852); White v. Tennant, 31
W. Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596 (1888).
6
9 See Miss. CODE ANN. §467 (1942).
97See Lawrence v. Kitteridge, 21 Conn. 577* (1852).
98See Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 US. 608 (1883); Riley v. Doing, 66 F. Supp. 825
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forum, of course, but occasionally an action will be brought in another
jurisdiction. In such a case the "law" of the situs includes the reference
of any applicable conflicts law. For example, if the court of the situs
of the land determines descent of land by referring to the law of the
deceased owner's domicile, another state would, by applying the conflicts rule of the situs, also look to the domicile of the deceased for
determination of descent. 99
Another quite common example occurs when a will invalid under
the local law of the situs may be validated by a situs statute that refers
to the law of the place of execution or of the deceased's domicile at
the time of execution or at death. 1 0 If the will is valid by the law
of the state of one of these alternative references, it will be sustained
0
anywhere. 11
The conflicts concern over the requirement of three
witnesses in some states is reduced, since each of these states has a
statute recognizing wills valid by the law of the place of execution.102
These statutes serve a most desirable purpose in a mobile society,
particularly in those states in which there is growth and influx of residents as in Florida. Of the more than thirty states having such a
statute,' 03 Florida is conspicuous by her absence. The enactment of
(S.D. Fla. 1946); Trotter v. Van Pelt, 144 Fla. 517, 198 So. 215 (1940); Crolly v. Clark,
20 Fla. 849 (1884); Lynch v. Miller, 54 Iowa 516, 6 N.W. 740 (1880); Toledo Soc'y
for Crippled Children v. Hickok, 152 Tex. 578, 261 S.W.2d 692 (1953).
9DIn re Schneider's Estate, 198 Misc. 1017, 96 N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sur. Ct. 1950); also
cases cited note 93 supra.
'00See, e.g., Model Execution of Wills Act, 9 U.L.A. 419; Wills Act, 1861, 24 & 25
Vicr. c. 114.
1o1C7. Irwin's Appeal, 33 Conn. 128 (1865); Lindsay v. Wilson, 103 Md. 252, 63
At. 566 (1906); In the Matter of Logasa's Estate, 161 Misc. 774, 293 N.Y. Supp. 116
(Surr. Ct. 1937); In the Matter of Fowler, 161 Misc. 204, 291 N.Y. Supp. 639 (Surr.
Ct. 1936).
102CONN. GEN. STAT. §6951 (1949); GA. CODE ANN. §113-709 (1933); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. C. 154, §14 (1954); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 191, §5 (1955); N.H. REV STAT.
ANN. §551:5 (1955); S.C. CODE §19-207 (1952); VT. REV. STAT. §2840 (1947). Three
witnesses may be preferable because of the value of an extra witness. See ATKINSON,

WiLLS 350 (2d ed. 1953). The conflicts effect of the requirements in Louisiana are
alleviated by a similar provision, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §9:2401 (1950).
103Axuz. CODE ANN. §38-215 (1939); ARK. STAT. ANN. §60-405 (Supp. 1955); CAL.
PROD. CODE §362 (Deering 1949), as amended 1953; CONN. GEN STAT. §6951 (1949);
GA. CODE ANN. §113-709 (1933); IDAHO CODE ANN. §15-222 (1947); ILL. REv. STAT.
c. 3, §237 (1955); IOWA CODE §633.49 (1954); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §59-609 (1949);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §9:2401 (1950); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. C. 154, §14 (1954); MD.
CODE ANN. art. 93, §365 (1951); MASS. ANN. LAws c. 191, §5 (1955); MicH. STAT. ANN.
§27.3178 (97) (Supp. 1955); MINN. STAT. §525.183 (1953); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§91-115 (1947); NED. REv. STAT. §30-204 (1943); NEV. Comp. LAWS §9929 (1929);
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a statute similar to Section 7 of the Model Execution of Wills Act'0 4
would be of particular service to the people of Florida.
Because of a few problems that have arisen under this statute and
its precedecessor, some modifications should be made.103 One of these
problems is caused by the omission from the statute of a reference to
the problem of revocation. The authorities are divided as to whether
foreign revocation is included under the term "execution,"''1 0 although apparently the purpose of the statute is to include foreign revocation as well as execution. A particularly acute though fortunately
not common aspect of this problem is revocation resulting from the
operation of law upon a divorce or a subsequent birth of a child.
Clearly these provisions are of concern to the domicile at the time of
death and to the domicile at the time of the event causing automatic
revocations. Nevertheless the situs law has usually controlled as to
immovables. Problems concerning validity, other than those relating
to the formalities, are also determined by the law of the situs. 0 " ConN.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §551:5 (1955); N.M. STAT. ANN. §30-1-10 (1953); N.Y. DECED.
EST. LAW §§22a, 23; N.D. Rxv. CODE §56-0306 (1943); OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, §72 (1951);
R.I. GEN. LAWS c. 566, §35 (1938); S.C. CODE §19-207 (1952); S.D. CODE §56.0212
(1939); TENN. CODE ANN. §32-107 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. §74-1-14 (1953); VT.
REV. CODE §11.12.020 (1951).
REv. STAT. §2840 (1947); W*%ASH.
1049 U.L.A. 419.
205The previously recommended Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Executed, included an alternative reference to the testator's domicile. The Model Act substitutes the domicile at the time of execution. Since the purpose of the act is to avoid
thwarting the testators expressed intentions by the accident of conflict of laws, both
references should be included. This change plus one aimed at the revocation problem would result in a provision appropriate for enactment in Florida such as the
following:
Foreign Execution of Wills. A will executed or revoked outside this state
in a manner prescribed by the laws of this state, or a written will executed
or revoked outside this state in a manner prescribed by the law of the place
of its execution or revocation or by the law of the testator's domicile at the
time of its execution or revocation or by the law of the testator's domicile at
the time of death, shall have the same force and effect in this state as if executed or revoked in this state in compliance with the provisions of the laws
of this state.
30 sSee In re Barrie's Estate, 240 Iowa 431, 35 N.W.2d 658 (1949); In the Matter
of Traversi, 189 Misc. 251, 64 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sunr. Ct. 1946); Owen v. Younger, 242
S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); see also In the Matter of Patterson, 64 Cal. App.
643, 222 Pac. 374 (1924).
1O'See Riley v. Doing, 66 F. Supp. 825 (S.D. Fla. 1946); Crolly v. Clark, 20 Fla.
849 (1884); Frazier v. Boggs, 37 Fla. 307, 20 So. 245 (1896); Peet v. Peet, 229 Il1. 341,
82 N.E. 376 (1907); Amerige v. Attorney-General, 324 Mass. 648, 88 N.E.2d 126
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sequently, limitations upon the testamentary power designed to protect the family of the testator 0 s or to prevent undue dispositions to
charity 00 are generally governed by the law of the situs notwithstanding the apparent dominant interest of the testator's domicile.
Although most courts probably would look to the situs of the immovable for a construction of the testator's will affecting it,110 the
draftsman should not rely upon this. In choosing the language of the
will he should also consider its effect at the domicile of the deceased
at the time of execution and at the place of execution. Clearly his
choice of terms should preclude any possible adverse construction in
any of these three jurisdictions as well as in a jurisdiction that he
may anticipate to be the testator's domicile at the time of death. This
is necessary because some courts have taken the view that a man
generally uses language in common usage at his home, that is, his
domicile; if the language is that of his attorney, the place of execution
determines the common usage.,," Although there is some force in
both these views and those that refer to the situs, the moral for the
draftsman is to avoid language having an adverse or different effect
in any of the states whose law may be applicable.
Here, as in the case of inter vivos trusts of immovables, the doctrine of equitable conversion affords a limited possibility of controlling the choice of law in the case of land.'" As has been noted
previously, for choice of law purposes it is possible that a court will
consider as movables land devised under direction to sell." x3 Likewise,
some will interpret a direction to purchase land in another state as
(1949); Pratt v. Douglas, 38 NJ. Eq. 516 (Ct. Err. & App. 1884). But see Keith
v. Eaton, 58 Kan. 732, 51 Pac. 271 (1897); Ford v. Ford, 70 Wis. 19; 33 N.W. 188

(1887).

108See Spence v. Spence, 239 Ala. 480, 195 So. 717 (1940); Bankers Trust Co. v.
Greims, 110 Conn. 36, 147 Ad. 290 (1929); In re Randolph's Estate, 175 Kan. 685,
266 P.2d 315 (1954); Ehler v. Ehler, 214 Iowa 789, 243 N.W. 591 (1932); cf. Estate
of Bir, 83 Cal. App.2d 256, 188 P.2d 499 (1948).
300See Decker v. Vreeland, 220 N.Y. 326, 115 N.E. 989 (1917); Joslin, Conflict of
Laws Problems Raised by "Modern Mortnain Acts," 60 DicK. L. REV. 7 (1955).

2'0E.g., Frazier v. Boggs, 37 Fla. 307, 20 So. 245 (1896); Scofield v. Hadden, 206
Iowa 597, 220 N.W. 1 (1928); Thompson v. Penn, 149 Ky. 158, 148 S.W. 33 (1912).
"See Higinbotham v. Manchester, 113 Conn. 62, 154 Ad. 242 (1931); Houghton
v. Hughes, 108 Me. 233, 79 Ad. 909 (1911); Staigg v. Atkinson, 144 Mass. 564, 12
N.E. 354 (1887); Matter of Dialogue, 159 Misc. 18, 287 N.Y. Supp. 237 (Surr. Ct.

1936).
"'2See p. 407 supra.
"13E.g., Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Trust Co., 250 Ill. 86, 95
N.E. 59 (1911).
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making the law of that state applicable."" Although this is a rather
slim reed upon which to plan an estate, it may have some use in a
particular case.
b. Movables
The flexibility of means of handling movable assets in the estate
plan, particularly in the case of intangibles represented by documents,
is reflected in the testamentary as well as the inter vivos dispositions.
The trust device is the most flexible for conflict of laws purposes,
though significant developments have occurred in the case of outright
bequests. The traditional choice of law rules are clear enough in
our Anglo-American system of law; they refer to the law of the testa15
the
tor's domicile at death. Thus the valid execution of a will,
7
6
beneficiaries,"
of
identification
validity of its provisions," and the
with but few exceptions, are governed by the testator's domicile at
death. The simplicity of the rule, as in the case of immovables, does
not mean that there are no problems. On the contrary, the fact of
near automatic application of the law of the last domicile to all problems often causes considerable question as to the reasonableness of
the result. This is perhaps pointed out by the problem of revocation
of bequests by operation of law by reason of divorce. 1 8 In determining
the appropriate property settlement on divorce, the parties and the
court will naturally consider the law of the state of the current domi"14Ford v. Ford, 80 Mich. 42, 44 N.W. 1057 (1890); Jenkins v. Guarantee Trust
and Safe Deposit Co., 53 N.J. Eq. 194, 32 Ad. 208 (Ct. Err. & App. 1895); Mount v.
Tuttle, 183 N.Y. 358, 76 N.E. 873 (1906); Bible Soc'y v. Pendleton, 7 W. Va. 79
(1873). This approach is approved and considered the majority view in LAND,
TRUSTS IN THE CONFLiar oF LAws 30 (1940); Note, 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1138 (1954).
Cf. 2 B.F-E, CONFLIcT OF LAWS §240.3 (1935).
"SSmith v. Croom, 7 Fla. 81 (1857); Gourley v. Miller, 302 Ky. 759, 196 S.W.2d
360 (1946); Moultrie v. Hunt, 23 N.Y. 394 (1861); White v. Tennant, 31 W. Va. 790,

8 S.E. 596 (1888).
ll6Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 (1916); Griley v. Griley, 43 So.2d 350 (Fla.
1949); Murphy v. Murphy, 125 Fla. 855, 170 So. 856 (1936); Healy v. Reed, 153 Mass.
197, 26 N.E. 404 (1891).
17Lowndes v. Cooch, 87 Md. 478, 39 At. 1045 (1898); Anderson v. French, 77
N.H. 509, 103 Ad. 1042 (1915); Simmons v. O'Connor, 149 S.W.2d 1107 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941); In re Laurence's Will, 93 Vt. 424, 108 Ad. 387 (1919). But cf. Hood v.
McGehee, 237 U.S. 611 (1915); In re Crossley's Estate, 135 Pa. Super. 524, 7 A.2d
539 (1939).
"1sSee FLA. STAT. §732.261 (1955); In the Matter of Patterson, 64 Cal. App. 643,
222 Pac. 374 (1923); see also note 106 supra.
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cile as the background for their conclusions."19 Upon a subsequent
change of domicile prior to death the new governing law may be
1 20
different, thus destroying the reasonable expectations of the parties.
In the case of revocation by reason of subsequent birth of a child, the
inappropriateness of the last domicile rule is not so apparent, because
it operates as a family protection device in which the domiciliary state
at death normally has the dominant interest.12' Particularly would
this be true if the births of different children were subject to varying
laws. In such a case the need for uniformity would call for a single
reference, and the last domicile might well be the most appropriate
choice. In such a highly unusual situation a court could well be expected to reach such a solution by appropriate construction of a
foreign execution or revocation statute. The courts, however, have
22
quite rigidly applied the law of the last domicile in such matters.
The statutes relating to foreign execution have not, as previously indicated,23
solved this particular problem, although appropriate statutory language could remedy the situation.
Limitations on Testation. The state has the power to restrict the
privilege of making testamentary transfers of property, 24 and all states
have done so in some fashion. Some of the restrictions, such as the
requirements for execution of wills, are designed to protect the testator against a disposition based on undue influence or casual statements;12 5 others are designed to protect those members of the testator's
iloThis because both jurisdiction and governing law are within the province
of the law of the state of the plaintiff's domicile at the time of the action, i.e., local
law. See Torlonia v. Torlonia, 108 Conn. 292, 142 AtI. 843 (1928); Stewart v. Stewart,
32 Idaho 180, 180 Pac. 165 (1919); Rose v. Rose, 132 Minn. 340, 156 N.W. 664 (1916).
120See In the Matter of Patterson, 64 Cal. App. 643, 222 Pac. 374 (1923); Irwin's
Appeal, 33 Conn. 128 (1865); Moultrie v. Hunt, 23 N.Y. 394 (1861); cf. In re Cutler's
Will, 114 Misc. 203, 186 N.Y. Supp. 271 (Surr. Ct. 1921). But cf. In the Matter of
Traversi, 189 Misc. 251, 64 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sur. Ct. 1946).
l21Cf. Healy v. Reed, 153 Mass. 197, 26 N.E. 404 (1891); Scoles, Conflict of Laws
and NonbarrableInterests in Administration of Decedents' Estates, 8 U. FLA. L. REv.
151 (1955).
22
2 1n the Matter of Patterson, supra note 120; In re Culley's Will, 182 Misc. 998,
48 N.Y.S.2d 216 (Sur. Ct. 1944); Matter of Coburn's Will, 9 Misc. 437, 30 N.Y. Supp.
383 (Sur. Ct. 1894); In re Smith's Estate, 55 Wyo. 181, 97 P.2d 677 (1940). But cf.
In re Martin [1900] P. 211.
123See note 106 supra and accompanying text.
l24Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556 (1942).
l2GThis is the general purpose of the statutes of wills, e.g., FLA. STAT. §731.07
(1955), and statutes prohibiting dispositions to charity within short periods before
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household that the custom of society indicates should be provided for
before he considers gifts to strangers.1 2 6 These family protection restrictions take various forms; in this country homestead, dower, forced
share, family allowance, and community property give direct interests
to particular family members. Restrictions on gifts to charity rest upon
policies reflecting attitudes opposing undue influence and undue accumulations by charities, as well as a desire to protect the estate owner's
family. Homestead interests are peculiarly local and attach to movables, which usually have a location at the domicile; consequently, few
2
conflict of laws problems arise in this regard.'
Dower, forced share, and family allowance matters raise significant
conflicts problems for the estate planner. For example, the interest
of the surviving spouse may be measured by assets located in states
other than the domicile.J28 This is true in Florida, where the widow
may receive a third of the movables wherever they may be located,
and the statute purports to give this portion before creditors' claims
are considered.129 In a case involving foreign assets it is possible for
the domicile to include out-of-state movables in measuring the nonbarrable interest of the surviving spouse, but it must be remembered
that these out-of-state assets are subject to administration and probably to creditors' claims wherever they are located. 30 Consequently,
in the case of movables the domicile's assets may bear substantially
the entire burden of the widow's election. In administration, premature reliance should not be placed on an election or failure to elect
in ancillary proceedings, since such an election is probably not binding
3
at the domicile.1 '

Community Property. Community property concepts can cause
considerable confusion in the estate of a client who has spent any part
death, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. §19-202 (1951), FLA. STAT. §781.19 (1955).
126E.g., FiA. CONST. art. X, §1; FLA. STAT. §§731.27,.34 (1955); IOWA CODE §635.3
(1954); N.Y. DEcau. EsT. LAw §17.
127E.g., FiA. CONST. art. X, §1; see Scoles, supra note 121, at 180.
'22Estate of Clemmons, 242 Iowa 1248, 49 N.W.2d 883 (1951); see also Caruso v.
Caruso, 106 N.J. Eq. 130, 148 At. 882 (Ct. Err. & App. 1930).
l29See FLA. STAT. §731.34 (1955); Henderson v. Usher, 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846
(1936); see also Griley v. Griley, 43 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1949); Murphy v. Murphy, 125
Fla. 855, 170 So. 856 (1936).
'SoFrick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 478 (1925).
"i3Griley v. Griley, supra note 129; Murphy v. Murphy, supra note 129; see
Scoles, Conflict of Laws and Election in Administration of Decedent's Estate, 30
IND. L.J. 293 (1955).
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of his married life in a community property state. 32 Rights in community property attach in most instances to movables according to
the law of the marital domicile at the time of acquisition, and the
assets are impressed with these interests wherever they may be taken
and into whatever form they may be traced; 133 under the doctrine of
substitution community property interests in the proceeds persist on
conversion. Because community assets belong to both spouses, the
decedent can dispose of only one half of them and the balance belongs
to the survivor.' 34 This means that, should the husband die, his estate
for purposes of distribution would include only one half of those
assets impressed with community property rights.' 35 The surprising
effect that this could have upon an estate planned solely on the assumption of common law property concepts could of course be disastrous. Therefore it is necessary to determine whether any of the
estate assets were acquired while the married client lived in a community property state or can be traced to property acquired in such a
state.
Charities. Restrictions on dispositions to charities have taken different forms in the United States. Florida invalidates bequests to
charities in instruments executed a short time before the testator's
death. 30 These "hell-fire" statutes are to be compared with the
"charity begins at home" statutes,' 37 which prevent charitable gifts
of more than a limited portion of the estate when certain members
of the testator's family survive. These statutes, designed primarily to
protect the family of the testator, can appropriately be viewed as restrictions upon power of testation. Consequently, the domicile at
death is the state having the dominant interest and whose law should
be controlling. This is generally the case when the question concerns
2
13 See MARSH, MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS (1952); Stumberg,
Marital Property and Conflict of Laws, 11 TEx. L. REv. 53 (1932); Thomas and
Thomas, Community Property and Conflict of Laws, 4 Sw. LJ. 46 (1950).
133Depas v. Mayo, 11 Mo. 314 (1848); Edwards v. Edwards, 108 Okla. 93, 233
Pac. 477 (1925); cf. King v. Bruce, 145 Tex. 647, 201 S.W.2d 803 (1947). But cf.
Gooding Milling & Elevator Co. v. Lincoln County State Bank, 22 Idaho 468, 126
Pac. 772 (1912).
'34See Stumberg, Testamentary Dispositions and the Conflict of Laws, 34 TEx.

L. Rxv. 28 (1955).
135Cf. Harral v. Harral, 39 NJ. Eq. 279 (Ct. Err. & App. 1884).
138FLA. STAT. §731.19 (1955); see also D.C. CODE ANN. §19-202 (1951); OHIo RMV.
CODE §2107.06 (Page 1955).
137E.g., IOWA CODE §633.3 (1954); N.Y. DEcED. EST. L. §17.
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movables. 1 38 The underlying policy considerations would seem to
indicate a preference for domicile control in charitable dispositions
of immovables as well, but this has not generally been true.139 Even
in the area of dispositions of movables there has been a significant
deviation from the usual rule when a policy favoring charitable trusts
has come in conflict with a policy of lesser strength than those concerning the family. 140 In these cases there is a marked tendency to
sustain the charitable trust.
Trusts. The policy toward sustaining trusts in general has had a
significant effect in the area of trusts of movables. Most of the litigated
cases have involved the Rule Against Perpetuities, rules against accumulation of income, or questions concerning the exercise of powers
of appointment. Since these problems are usually present in connection with trusts rather than legal interests in movables, the trust cases
represent the bulk of litigation in this area. In those cases the courts
have permitted the testator's intent to control to the extent that he
can probably choose the law to govern the trust if that law has a
reasonably substantial connection with the trust. This is best illustrated by two similar cases. In Cross v. United States Trust Co.' 41 the
settlor, domiciled in Rhode Island, left a will executed in New York,
where she died, leaving property to a New York trustee to be administered there for New York beneficiaries. The trust was invalid
under the New York rule against perpetuities but valid under the law
of Rhode Island. The New York court, in applying Rhode Island law
42
and holding the trust valid, stated:
"It does not follow that a trust created by the laws of another
state is contrary to our public policy with respect to accumulations and the suspension of the absolute ownership, simply because the law of the state differs in some respects from ours.
'3sHealy v. Reed, 153 Mass. 197, 26 N.E. 404 (1891).
l39Matter of Dwyer, 159 Cal. 680, 115 Pac. 242 (1911); Decker v. Vreeland, 220
N.Y. 326, 115 N.E. 989 (1917).
140See Hope v. Brewer, 136 N.Y. 126, 32 N.E. 558 (1892); Note, 32 COLUmn. L. R~v.
680, 684 (1932): "[T]he decided cases have manifested marked effort to sustain
charitable trusts, but the applicable rule is highly unclear. In the one matter of
unconverted land, the cases agree upon a choice, that of the lex rei sitae. In personalty, the result has been almost uniformly favorable to the validity of the trust,
but the route is dubious."
141131 N.Y. 330, 30 N.E. 125 (1892).
2421d. at 341, 30 N.E. at 127.
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It may be assumed that all our sister states have enacted laws on
this subject having the same general purpose in view as our
own. Some of them permit a longer and others provide for a
shorter period of suspension, but the policy of all is the same."
The second case, In the Matter of Chappell, 43 came before the
Washington court. The Chappell trust was invalid under the law of
the domicile, California, but valid under the law of Washington, where
it was to be administered. The court sustained the trust on the basis
that the testator intended that Washington law apply. The significance
of these cases lies in the fact that the testator's intention was carried
out, thus sustaining the trust. The first court accomplished this by
means ot a traditional doctrinal vehicle, while the other used the more
recently developed concept of the intended choice of law.'14 Similar
results have been reached in other cases. 145 It is clear that in this
area of trusts the draftsmen by use of an express provision can choose
the governing law from among those states having some reasonable
46
connection with the trust.
Recent statutory developments have indicated that in the area of
nontrust testamentary dispositions, as well as those subject to a trust,
the draftsman's control is being increased. Several states have adopted
"13124 Wash. 128, 213 Pac. 684 (1923).
1-14In an analogous case, Hope v. Brewer, 136 N.Y. 126, 32 N.E. 558 (1892), the
New York court further indicated its concern with the law intended by the testator, applying the law of the place of administration of a testamentary trust rather
than the law of the testator's domicile to sustain the trust. Also, in connection with
inter vivos trusts the court in sustaining a trust has applied the law of the domicile
of the settlor, on the theory that this law was the one intended by him. Shannon v.
Irving Trust Co., 275 N.Y. 95, 9 N.E.2d 792 (1937); cf. Hutchinson v. Ross, 262 N.Y.
381, 187 N.E. 65 (1933).
Il-National Shawmut Bank v. Cumming, 325 Mass. 457, 91 N.E.2d 337 (1950);
Amerige v. Attorney General, 324 Mass. 648, 88 N.E.2d 126 (1949); Sewall v. Wilmer,
132 Mass. 131 (1882); Fellows v. Miner, 119 Mass. 541 (1876); see also Wilmington
Trust Co. v. Sloane, 30 Del. Ch. 103, 54 A.2d 544 (Ch. 1947); Wilmington Trust Co.
v. Wilmington Trust Co., 26 Del. Ch. 397, 24 A.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
1OLAND, TRUSTS IN THE CONFLICT oF LAWS 118 (1940), states: "The cases seem
to indicate that, in both testamentary and intervivos trusts of intangible personal
property the creator may control the choice of the law governing the essential
validity of the trust by an express provision in the trust instrument provided he selects the law of a state which has some substantial connection with the trust. In
cases dealing with the essential validity of the exercise of a power of appointment, it
is possible, but not certain, that a donor could effectively provide that an appointment be good if the donee's will satisfied the law of the donee's domicile."
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statutes providing that testamentary dispositions by nonresidents of
assets located in the state shall be governed by local law if the testator
so provides. 147 Hence the testator can by locating assets within such
a state gain the advantage of any favorable local law relating to the
disposition of property therein. 148 Considering all of these trends, the
indication is certainly toward more control of conflict of laws problems
by the draftsman in the area of testamentary dispositions of movable
assets. The planner of the multi-state estate should avail himself of
this additional insurance for avoiding conflicts problems by including
a well-drafted choice of law clause.
PART II-

ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

A significant part of planning any estate is the consideration
of the problems of administration. During administration the benefits or defects of any plan appear. By then, however, except in the
alterable inter vivos trust, it is often too late to make corrective modifications. Consequently, an appreciation of administration is a necessary prerequisite to effective planning and drafting.
TRUST ADMINISTRATION

Immovables
The law governing administration of trusts of immovables, whether
inter vivos or testamentary, is traditionally referred to the situs of
the land involved. 49 This means that any powers given to the trustee
or to be exercised by the trustee must necessarily be valid according
to the law of the situs. The rights of beneficiaries and the extent to
which their interests may be subjected to or protected from claims of
creditors are likewise questions for the situs15 0 This should be qualified by the recognition that the doctrine of equitable conversion, as
4

'1 7ILL. REv. STAT. c. 3, §241 (b)

(1955); MICH. STAT. ANN. §27.3178 (Supp. 1955);

N.Y. DEcED. ESr. LAw §47.
148For definition of assets located within state see ILL. REV. STAT. c. 3, §207 (1955).
'49McLoughlin v. Shaw, 95 Conn. 102, 111 At. 62 (1920); Kerr v. White, 52 Ga.
362 (1874); Greenough v. Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 126 N.E. 461 (1920); White v.
White, 197 Misc. 822, 97 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
50oSpindle v. Shreve, III U.S. 542 (1884); Moore v. Sinnott, 117 Ga. 1010, 44 S.E.
810 (1903); Sinnott v. Moore, 113 Ga. 908, 39 S.E. 415 (1901); Fowler v. Webster, 173
N.C. 442, 92 S.E. 157 (1917); cf. Collier v. Blake, 14 Kan. 250 (1875).
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determined by the law of the situs, 51 may treat land as movable; hence
a change of governing law may occur. 152 Equitable conversion should
be distinguished from ordinary sales and reinvestments by the trustee.
The latter should not entail a change of governing law in so far as
153
internal problems of the trust are concerned.
Although the force of the existing authorities indicates that an accounting of the trustee of land shall be in the courts of the state of
the situs,154 there is an exception for emergency. For example, should

a trustee have sold the land, refused to perform the trust, and moved
to another jurisdiction, the courts will entertain an accounting when
personal jurisdiction can be acquired, upon a showing that the defendant trustee is not available for suit at the more appropriate
155
forum.
Although there are few reasons why most administrative matters
should not be ruled by nonsitus law if so desired by the settlor, there
is little authority supporting this control by the settlor. The specification of express powers, however, will in many instances effectively
accomplish the settlor's wishes and be recognized at the situs. Also,
since an investment of trust assets in foreign land does not change the
governing law to that of the situs of the land, it is possible to prevent
the application of the situs law by establishing a trust of movables
with the trustee authorized to invest in foreign real estate and then
selling the land to the trustee.
There is need to limit the effective interest of the situs state to
problems of recording and alienability and to protection of third
parties relying on the record. Since it is possible that a reference to
nonsitus law for administrative purposes might be sustained, a specific
' 5 'See

Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Ackerman, 123 NJ. Eq. 556, 199 Atl. 379 (1938); Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N.Y.
424 (1870).
15 2See First Nat'l Bank v. National Broadway Bank, 156 N.Y. 459, 51 N.E. 398
(1898); Hope v. Brewer, 136 N.Y. 126, 32 N.E. 558 (1892).
153Fisk's Appeal, 81 Conn. 433, 71 At. 559 (1908); Acker v. Priest, 92 Iowa 610,
67 N.W. 235 (1894); Bishop v. Bishop, 258 N.Y. 216, 179 N.E. 391 (1932). But cf.
Sinnott v. Moore, supra note 150; Collier v. Blake, 14 Kan. 250 (1875); First Nat'l
Bank v. National Broadway Bank, supra note 152.
154Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900); Williams v. Nichol, 47 Ark. 254, 1 S.W.
243 (1886); Monypeny v. Monypeny, 202 N.Y. 90, 95 N.E. 1 (1911); Will of Hebblewhite, 228 Wis. 259, 280 N.W. 384 (1938).
15GSmyrna Theatre Co. v. Missir, 198 App. Div. 181, 189 N.Y. Supp. 4 (2d Dep't
1921); Watkins v. Watkins, 160 Tenn. 1, 22 S.W.2d 1 (1929); cf. Falke v. Terry, 32
Colo. 85, 75 Pac. 425 (1904).
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provision in the dispositive instrument designating the law intended
should not be discounted even in trusts of immovables. 15 6
Foreign CorporationsAs Trustees
Before discussing the general choice of law problems as to movables,
the matter of the identity of the trustee should be noted. In most
instances a trustee will be an individual residing at the place where the
trust is to be administered or a corporation authorized to do business
there. It is quite a common occurrence, however, that a client's needs
or desires indicate the selection of a nonresident individual or a
foreign trust company. Florida, like many other states, has some
pertinent statutes on this matter. A statute in the banking code"'5
provides that a foreign corporation cannot act as trustee of local real
estate, but it does permit the foreign corporation to receive bequests of
money or intangibles in trust.158 Though re-enacted in 1953 as part
of the banking code, this statute has been in effect for many years.35
The Trust Accounting Law, 60 adopted in 1951, contains provisions
that might well be considered to have intended a modification of the
provision prohibiting administration of realty by a foreign corporation. This last statute expressly recognizes the settlor's power to
choose the governing law and the place of administration of the testamentary trust. The statute states, in part:' 6 '
"... provided, however, that if the trustee is a nonresident individual or a corporation organized under the laws of some other
jurisdiction and having its principal place of business in some
other state or country and where it appears from the will that
the testator intended the trust to be administered in and subject to the laws of the jurisdiction in which the individual trustee resides or the corporate trustee has its principal place of
business, such individuals or corporate trustee shall be exempt
from the provisions of this chapter and the county judge shall
authorize distribution of any property devised or bequeathed
to the trustee without requiring such individual or corporate
trustee to establish his qualifications hereunder."
156Cf. SHATTuCK, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK

328 (1950).

'57FLA. STAT. §660.10 (4) (1955).
158FLA. STAT.

§660.10 (3) (1955).

' 59See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §655.27 (1949).
16OFLA. STAT. §737.02 (1955).
'61FLA. STAT. §737.02 (1) (1955). Emphasis supplied.
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This provision appears to recognize the settlor's privilege of appointing a foreign corporate trustee not only in cases of movables but
also in cases of "devises," that is, testamentary trusts of real estate.
Although this would be a forward-looking legislative step that would
be welcomed by many,' 62 it is doubtful that the Legislature intended
to take the step in such a casual manner. Nevertheless, the provision
exists, and it should be noted that, even though the Florida Legislature has adopted some rather provincial provisions in the estates
area,10 3 it has also led the way with some very effective provisions that
recognize the existence of a mobile population.'
Movables
As is the case in other areas of trust law, the law governing the
administration of trusts of movables has seen much recent development.
Although there is some evidence that a few courts might apply the
law of the testator's domicile at death to problems of administration
of trusts of movables,' 65 the weight of authority indicates that domicile
is not the controlling factor in the choice of law applicable to trusts, 66
particularly inter vivos trusts.' 6 7 The courts have generally refused

to permit any single factor to control in determining the governing law
but have applied the law of the state with the most significant contact
with the trust." 8 The significant contact is usually determined by a
preponderance of the factors at the time of execution of the trust instrument or at the time it becomes effective.1 69 Of the many factors that

are considered, it appears that the intention of the settlor is a pri162See,
e.g., Need for Reciprocity on Out of State Trust Institutions, 31 TRUST
BULL. 3 (1951).
163E.g., FLA. STAT. §732.36 (1955).
104E.g., FLA. STAT. §734.30 (1955).
l 65 See 2 BEALE, CONFLiCr OF LAws §297.1 (1935).
l 6 See Cadbury v. Parrish, 89 N.H. 464, 200 Atl. 791 (1938); Hope v. Brewer, 136
N.Y. 126, 32 N.E. 558 (1892); Lanius v. Fletcher, 100 Tex. 550, 101 S.W. 1076 (1907);
Will of Risher, 227 Wis. 104, 277 N.W. 160 (1938); cf. FLA. STAT. §737.02 (1955).
1o7People v. First Nat'l Bank, 364 Ill. 262, 4 N.E.2d 378 (1936); National Shawmut Bank v. Cumming, 325 Mass. 457, 91 N.E.2d 337 (1950); Greenough v. Osgood,
235 Mass. 235, 126 N.E. 461 (1920); Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65
(1933).
16sUnion and New Haven Trust Co. v. Watrous, 109 Conn. 268, 146 Atl. 727
(1928); Spooner v. Phillips, 62 Conn. 62, 24 Atd. 524 (1892); People v. First Natl
Bank, supra note 167; Harvey v. Fiduciary Trust Co., 299 Mass. 457, 13 N.E.2d 299
(1938).
looSale v. Saunders, 24 Miss. 24 (1852); Selleck v. Hawley, 331 Mo. 1038, 56 S.W.2d
387 (1932); Hope v. Brewer, infra note 170; Cadbury v. Parrish, 89 N.H. 464, 200
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mary one.' 70 This is of course consistent with the most basic policy in
the area of planning, that is, to effectuate as nearly as possible the desires of the estate owner. This intention may be reflected in an ex-

press choice of law clause17 1 or perhaps implied by a favorable law
presumption' 72- that is, that law must have been intended that would
enable the trust to accomplish the settlor's wishes. The intention also
may be implied from other contacts with a particular state, 73 but the
state whose law is so designated must have a substantial relation to
the trust. 7 4 This suggests what has probably been the next most significant factor: the place of administration of the trust as indicated
by the trustee's residence and place of business and the location of the
assets.

1 75

A third contact that should probably be mentioned in the case of
a testamentary trust is the domicile of the settlor at the time of his
death."76 Because of occasional statutory requirements that a testamentary trustee shall qualify before and account to the probate court, this
factor assumes considerable significance in some states. 7 7 The Florida
statute, 7 1 on the other hand, dearly permits the testator to avoid apAt. 791 (1938); Lozier v. Lozier, 99 Ohio St. 254, 124 N.E. 167 (1919); Cronin's
Case, 326 Pa. 343, 192 At. 397 (1937); Lanius v. Fletcher, 100 Tex. 550, 101 S.W.

1076 (1907).
l7oEstate of Beckwith v. Cooper, 258 111. App. 411 (1930); Amerige v. Attorney
General, 324 Mass. 648, 88 N.E.2d 126 (1949); Hope v. Brewer, 136 N.Y. 126, 32 N.E.
r
558 (1892); Will of Risher, 227 Wis. 104, 277 N." . 160 (1938).
17lLiberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. New England Investors Shares, Inc., 25 F.2d
493 (D. Mass. 1928); National Shawmut Bank v. Cumming, supra note 167; Matter
of Adriance, 158 Misc. 857, 286 N.Y. Supp. 936 (Surr. Ct. 1936); Will of Risher,
supra note 170.
l72Hope v. Brewer, supra note 170; Lanius v. Fletcher, supra note 169.
173Rosenbaum v. Garrett, 57 NJ. Eq. 186, 41 At. 252 (Ch. 1898); Matter of
McAuliffe, 167 Misc. 783, 4 N.Y.S.2d 605 (Surr. Ct. 1938); Lozier v. Lozier, 99 Ohio
St. 254, 124 N.E. 167 (1919).
'74 See LAND, TRUSTS IN THE CONFLICT oF LAWS 242 (1940); Cavers, Trusts Inter
Vivos and the Conflict of Laws, 44 HARV. L. REv. 161, 167 (1930).
175Union and New Haven Trust Co. v. Watrous, 109 Conn. 268, 146 Ad. 727
(1928); People v. First Nat'1 Bank, 364 Ill. 262, 4 N.E.2d 378 (1936); Greenough v.
Osgood, 235 Mass. 235, 126 N.E. 461 (1920); Hope v. Brewer, 136 N.Y. 126, 32 N.E.
558 (1892); Lanius v. Fletcher, 100 Tex. 550, 101 S.W. 1076 (1907).
'76See Sale v. Saunders, 24 Miss. 24 (1852); Cadbury v. Parrish, 89 N.H. 464, 200

At. 791 (1938).
"'7See, e.g., McCullough's Ex'rs v. McCullough, 44 N.J. Eq. 313, 14 At. 123 (1888);
Bradford's Estate, 165 Misc. 736, 1 N.Y.S.2d 539 (Surf. Ct. 1937); Cronin's Case, 326
Pa. 343, 192 Ad. 397 (1937).
'78FLA. STAT. §737.02 (1955).
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plication of the law of the domicile even in testamentary trusts, and
this is the dominant view in the United States.179 The result of these
varying attitudes is to permit the settlor in most cases to control the
law governing administration by designating the law he desires to be
applied, by indicating the place of administration, and by appointing a
trustee who resides or does business in that place. It is the planner's
duty to see that the law so chosen is favorable to the trust program,
so that its provisions are not thwarted.
Once the law governing administration is determined, it will apply
to such matters as investments, implied powers of the trustee, when
and to whom the trustee must account, depreciation and amortization
questions, and whether creditors can reach beneficiaries' interests. 80
Illustrative of the flexibility possible in a given estate, the governing
law perhaps may be split up. For example, the law of one state may
govern compensation of the trustee and of another state the powers
of the trustee.18 This is, of course, subject to the qualification
that the states whose law is so chosen must have a significant relationship to the trust. The split governing law cases may be more reasonably explained on the ground that the settlor could have spelled out
the provision in question and has simply used a shorthand method
of so doing - a type of incorporation by reference. 8 2 If this is the real
basis, there seems to be no need for significant contacts with the state
so selected; but ie courts have not yet recognized this.
Another technique for which there is authority and which may
well be useful, particularly in long-term trusts, is to bring about a
shift or subsequent change in law governing administration of a trust.
By using this approach it is possible in some cases to have the trust
administered under the law of one state for a period of time and then
under the law of another for a subsequent period. Thus the appointment, pursuant to the trust terms, of a successor trustee domiciled in a
state different from that in which the trust was originally administered
has been held to effect a change of law governing administration.183
179See notes 170, 171, 172 supra.
180See LAND, TRusTs IN THE CONFLICT

OF LAWS 197 (1940).
'See Macy v. Mercantile Trust Co., 68 N.J. Eq. 235, 59 Ad. 586 (Ch. 1904);
Shannon v. Irving Trust Co., 275 N.Y. 95, 9 N.E.2d 792 (1937); Keeney v. Morse, 71
App. Div. 104, 75 N.Y. Supp. 728 (1st Dep't 1902).
182See LAND, op. cit. supra note 180, at 247.
ls3Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 26 Del. Ch. 397, 24 A.2d 309
(1942); In the Matter of New York Trust Co., 195 Misc. 598, 87 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup.
Ct. 1949); cf. Wilmington Trust Co. v. Sloane, 30 Del. Ch. 103, 54 A.2d 544 (Ch.
18

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1956

35

432

Florida Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 4 [1956], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

There probably must be some evidence of an intention on the part
of the settlor to accomplish this result. The mere change of residence
by an individual trustee has been held insufficient to change governing
84
law.'
The trend toward permitting greater flexibility in the intention
of the settlor in the general area of trusts is reflected in conflicts problems. The use of the choice of law clause for the purpose of fixing the
law governing administration of a trust appears to assure the application of the designated law in nearly every instance, provided the state
whose law is so chosen bears some substantial relationship to a significant element of the trust. The draftsman of an estate plan that
includes present or possible future interstate elements should avail
himself of this method of reducing the conflicts problems relating to
administration of trusts.
PROBATE AND ADMINISTRATION OF WILLS

Administration is sometimes referred to as the proving ground for
estate planning, as it is during administration that any oversights are
certain to appear. While a detailed analysis of conflict of law problems in administration cannot be undertaken here, some of the matters
that must be relied upon in planning most cases will be outlined. 85
Administration involves four major functions: probating the will, collecting assets, paying claims and charges, and distribution. Under
the American system of administration the estate owner must anticipate administration in every state in which he leaves property at
death. 88 Although this requirement is quite inappropriate for a mobile society, it nevertheless has few exceptions. 8 7 Further, the will may
well have to be proved in each state. In the case of immovables the
will must be proved at each situs as an original probate, 88 and any
1947); Estate of Beckwith v. Cooper, 258 II. App. 411 (1930); Amerige v. Attorney
General, 324 Mass. 648, 88 N.E.2d 126 (1949); see also CONN. REv. STAT. §4838 (1930).
l84Swetland v. Swetland, 107 N.J. Eq. 504, 153 At. 907 (Ct. Err. & App. 1931);
Lewis v. County of Chester, 60 Pa. 325 (1869).
's5See Rheinstein and Scoles, Conflict Avoidance in Succession Planning,21 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 499 (1956).
is6See Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925); Crolly v. Clark, 20 Fla. 849
(1884).
l8See Opton, Recognition of Foreign Heirship and Succession Rights to Personal Property in America, 19 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 156 (1950).
lSSClarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900); Riley v. Doing, 66 F. Supp. 825 (S.D. Fla.
1946); Trotter v. Van Pelt, 144 Fla. 517, 198 So. 215 (1940); Hofferd v. Coyle, 212
Ind. 520, 8 N.E.2d 827 (1937); In re Barrie's Estate, 240 Iowa 431, 35 N.W.2d 658
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exceptions must rest upon the provisions of the governing law of the
situs.SD
Although movables likewise are subject to administration at their
situs, 100 the problem of determining this situs may be quite complicated.
Chattels, that is, tangibles, are subject to administration where found.' 9'
Negotiable instruments, in which the paper is complete evidence of
the obligation, likewise are subject to administration where the paper
is located. 9 2 Since adoption of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act by
all of the states it seems likely that the same approach will be taken
in administering corporate stocks when transferable by endorsement
or delivery. 93 Though there is some authority for this approach at
common law, 94 most cases prior to the Uniform Stock Transfer Act
required administration at the corporate domicile, the place of incorporation.19
Because of the expense and inconvenience of ancillary administration, the opportunities for avoiding it should be kept in mind in
planning the multi-state estate. By opportune location of securities
many administrative problems can be avoided. Ancillary administration of accounts receivable due the deceased can be avoided by voluntary payment to the domiciliary administrator. The debtor in such
a case is protected if local administration has not begun,:9 and probably if he has no notice of any local administration9 g A Florida stat(1949).
's 9See Crippen v. Dexter, 79 Mass. 330 (1859); Wis. STAT. §310.07 (1953).
'o0See Carey, Jurisdiction Over Decedents' Estates, 24 ILL. L. Ra. 44 (1929);
Goodrich, Problems of Foreign Administration, 39 HARv. L. Rxv. 797 (1926).
'9iCf. Cox v. Kansas City, 86 Kan. 298, 120 Pac. 553 (1912); Morrison v. Hass,
229 Mass. 514, 118 N.E. 893 (1918).
'102Smith v. Normart, 51 Ariz. 134, 75 P.2d 38 (1938); Lang's Estate, 801 Pa. 429,
152 At. 570 (1930). Nonnegotiable debts and choses in action are subject to administration where jurisdiction can be obtained over the debtor for suit to collect.
Furst v. Brady, 375 Ill. 425, 31 N.E.2d 606 (1940); Gordon v. Shea, 300 Mass. 95, 14
N.E.2d 105 (1938); see also Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
'9-See Baker, In the Administration of Intangibles: Missouri's Section 466.010 in
Perspective, 19 Mo. L. REV. 1 (1954); Hopkins, Conflict of Laws in Administration
of Decedents' Intangibles, 28 Iowa L. RFv. 422 (1943); Pomerance, The 'Situs' of
Stock, 17 CoRNE,LL.Q. 43 (1931); cf. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 3, §207 (1955).
19g4Lohman v. Kansas City So. Ry., 326 Mo. 868, 33 S.W.2d 117 (1930); Griswold
v. Kelly Springfield Tire Co., 94 N.J. Eq. 308, 120 At. 325 (Ch. 1916).
195E.g., Albuquerque Nat'l Bank v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 212 F.2d 943 (5th Cir.
1954); Kennedy v. Hodges, 215 Mass. 112, 102 N.E. 432 (1913).
OaGWilkins v. Ellett, 108 U.S. 256 (1883).
'97Maas v. German Say. Bank, 176 N.Y. 377, 68 N.E. 658 (190S); see Beale,
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ute' 98 authorizes suit against debtors of the estate by the foreign personal representative and approves direct payment by the debtors to
the foreign representative if no written demand by the local personal
representative has been received within three months after appointment of the foreign representative. Wider adoption of this type of
statute would result in more prompt and efficient settlement of many
estates. To overcome any possible limitations by will, the executor
should be given power in the will to act outside the state of his appointment and to negotiate settlement of such matters on behalf of
the estate.
The will should be first probated at the domicile in nearly every
case, since, as to movables, its admission there is usually taken as
conclusive evidence of its validity elsewhere;1 99 the probate may also
to Lord
be conclusive as to immovables if the situs has an act similar
201
20 0
Act.
Wills
of
Execution
Model
the
or
Act
Kingsdown's
One of the more troublesome provincial concepts in the area of
administration, which often prevents prompt settlement of the estate,
relates to claims of creditors. Creditors can usually initiate administration of the estate if it is not begun by others.202 Also creditors are
20 3
permitted to file a claim in any court administering estate assets;
and, although payment discharges the claim, disallowance by one court
generally has not been a bar to another claim on the same facts in a
second state.2 0 4 Even though a state rather clearly cannot discriminate against nonresidents by giving priority to local creditors,205 the
doctrine in this area of creditor's rights has not yet seen a mature development. The unity of an estate consisting of assets in several jurisdictions has been substantially recognized only in cases involving inVoluntary Payment to a ForeignAdministrator,42 HARv. L. REv. 597 (1929); Mersch,
Voluntary Payment to Foreign Administrator,18 GEo. L.J. 130 (1930).
198FLA. STAT. §734.30 (1955); see also CoLo. REV. STAT. §152-6-4 (1953); ILL. REV.
STAT. C. 3, §419 (1955).
199Lee v. Monks, 318 Mass. 513, 62 N.E.2d 657 (1945); Martin v. Stovall, 103 Tenn.

1, 52 S.W. 296 (1899); cf. FLA. STAT. §734.31 (1955).
20owills Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Viar. c. 114.
2019 U.L.A. 419.
202See Putnam v. Pitney, 45 Minn. 242, 47 N.W. 790 (1891).
2O3Buckingham Hotel Co. v. Kimberly, 138 Mass. 445, 103 So. 213 (1925); In re
Estate of Hirsch, 146 Ohio St. 393, 66 N.E.2d 636 (1946); Coffey v. Durand, 27 Tenn.
App. 704, 167 S.W.2d 684 (1940); Tyler v. Thompson, 44 Tex. 497 (1876).
24Ingersoll v. Coram, 211 U.S. 335 (1908); Johnston v. McKinnon, 129 Ala. 223,
29 So. 696 (1900); Nash v. Benari, 117 Me. 491, 105 At. 107 (1918).
205See Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898).
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solvent estates. 20 0 This places an exceptional value upon the negotiating ability of the domiciliary executor if he is to persuade all creditors
to file their claims at the domicile and to forego requiring administration elsewhere. The draftsman should at least make certain that the
will does not limit the executor; he should be given extensive powers
to negotiate out-of-state settlements without restriction.
The final opportunity for overcoming distortions in the testamentary scheme caused by multi-state administration comes with distribution. If there are sufficient assets at the domicile and all legatees
must look to domiciliary assets for satisfaction of their legacies, the
plan of distribution valid at the domicile can usually be given substantial effect notwithstanding distortions caused by foreign law. Distribution of immovables occurs at the situs. 207 Ordinarily, however,
distribution of ancillary movables will not only be made according to
the law of the domicile but usually is made by the domiciliary court
after transmission to it for that purpose.2 08 Only occasionally, because
of a strong local public policy, will the nondomiciliary situs of movables exercise the prerogative of local distribution by ancillary law.209
In such cases the domicile can, by being the last to distribute, adjust its
own distribution to compensate for any distribution elsewhere. Two
leading Florida cases are Griley v. Griley2l ° and Murphy v. Murphy. 211
Each permitted a widow who had taken a contrary position in ancillary administration to receive only that total amount to which she
would be entitled by Florida law, offsetting against that share the
amounts received elsewhere.212 Although the law of Florida is fairly
clear in this regard, possible litigation could be avoided by the inclusion of a specific authorization to the executor directing him, in
making distribution under the will, to consider amounts received by
a legatee or intestate successor of the decedent's estate in any jurisdiction.
In approaching the problems of planning that are potential by
206See Ramsay v. Ramsay, 196 IUl. 179, 63 N.E. 618 (1902); Goodall v. Marshall,
11 N.H. 88 (1840); In re Estate of Hirsch, supra note 203; Estate of Hanreddy, 176
Wis. 570, 186 N.W. 744 (1922).
207Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900).
"oSSee GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 576 (3d ed. 1949).
-091Lawrence v. Kitteridge, 21 Conn. 577 (1852).
21043 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1949).
211125 Fla. 855, 170 So. 856 (1936).
212See also Cumming's Estate, 153 Pa. 397, 25 At. 1125 (1893); Van Dyke's Appeal,
60 Pa. 481 (1869); In re Lawrence's Will, 93 Vt. 424 (1919); Scoles, Conflict of Laws
and Elections in Administration of Decedents' Estates,30 IND. LJ.293, 308 (1955).
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reason of multi-state administration of the decedent's estate, the
planner must consider the future effect of location of assets and of
varying law and give the executor complete powers to act, so that if
the courts will approve his acts he is at least not hampered by a restrictive instrument.
PART III-

TAX PROBLEMS

DOUBLE TAXATION

One of the fears of the wealthy client is that his estate assets may
be subjected to the burden of a death tax by more than one state. As
far as the United States Constitution is concerned the fear is well
justified. The Supreme Court has held that taxes imposed upon an
estate measured by intangibles and based upon a finding of domicile
within more than one state are not unconstitutional. Illustrative is
the famous Dorrance litigation, 213 in which the estate paid over
$10,000,000 in taxes to Pennsylvania only to discover that New Jersey
also considered the decedent a domiciliary and required the payment
of an additional tax of over $15,000,000. Such action was not found
to present a reviewable constitutional question. In a subsequent case
14
the Supreme Court put it thus:2

"Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the full faith and
credit clause requires uniformity in the decision of the courts
of different states as to the place of domicile, where the exertion
of state power is dependent upon domicile within its boundaries."
Double taxation may also result from different tax bases, such as
213Dorrance v. Thayer-Martin, 115 NJ. Eq. 268, 170 At. 601 (Prerog. Ct. 1934),
aff'd, 13 NJ. Misc. 168, 176 At. 902 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 116 NJ.L. 362, 184 At.
743, cert. denied, 298 U.S. 678 (1936); Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393 (1935); New
Jersey v. Pennsylvania, 287 U.S. 580 (1933) (motion to file bill of complaint denied);
Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 Adt. 303 (1932); cf. Massachusetts v. Missouri,
308 U.S. 1 (1939); Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
2i4Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 299 (1937); see also Guterman, Avoidance of Double Death Taxation of Estates and Trusts, 95 U. PA. L. REv.
701 (1947); Knapp, Solutions of the Double Domicile Problem, 15 CONN. B.J. 251
(1941); Tweed and Sargent, Death and Taxes Are Certain -But What of Domicile,
53 HtAv. L. REY. 68 (1939); cf. Bittker, The Taxation of Out-of-State Tangible
Property, 56 YALE L.J. 640 (1947); Harrow, Relation of JurisdictionalLimitations

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol9/iss4/2

40

Scoles: Conflict of Laws in Estate Plannning
CONFLICT OF LAWS
domicile and situs. The existing authorities seem to permit the domicile to tax foreign inter vivos trusts of movables in which some benefit
or control is retained by the deceased settlor, 2 1 5 with a probable though
2 16
not certain exception as to assets having a business situs elsewhere.
The state in which tangibles or intangible assets are located may also
impose a tax without constitutional violation.2 17 This burdensome
possibility has been alleviated through adoption of reciprocal and
nonresident exemption statutes by most of the states.2 18 These do not
afford automatic protection to an estate, however, particularly because
of different construction of the different statutes. It is incumbent upon
the estate planner to advise his client that location of assets in different
states may result in additional tax burdens. Further, the law of each
state in which assets are located, in which the estate owner may be
considered domiciled, or in which there are trusts administered that
might be included in the estate for tax purposes, must be investigated
and considered. If assets can be located so as to force the taxing states
into the courts of a single state for satisfaction of their claims, the
states submitting their case to a common tribunal will be effectively
21 9
bound by the findings of that court.
The problem of multiple taxation exists also in the international
area, where considerable relief has been afforded by treaties with
different countries.220 It should be borne in mind that the problem
is not limited to death taxes but also exists in regard to income and
property taxes, as to which the same precautions should be taken. 22 1
on Power to Tax to Conflict of Laws in Decedents' Estates, 20 A.B.AJ. 116 (1934).
21Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625
(1916).
2lcTreichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v.
Schnader, 293 U.S. 112 (1934); see also Commissioner v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174 (1942);
Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
2llSee Treichler v. Wisconsin, supra note 216; Curry v. McCanless, supra note
215; City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, supra note 216; Bullen v. Wisconsin,
240 U.S. 625 (1916).
21sSee, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§198.02,.03,.44 (1955); 1 P-H INH. & TRANs. TAX SFv.
(11th ed.) 1851 (1956).
21
9See Matter of Trowbridge, 266 N.Y. 283, 194 N.E. 756 (1935); see also Curry
v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); Matter of Benjamin, 289 N.Y. 554, 43 N.E.2d 531
(1942).
2204A P-H FED. TAx SEav. ff128,011 (1956).
221See generally Bittker, supra note 214; cf. Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota,
322 U.S. 292 (1944); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penny Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940); New York
ex rel. Whitney v. Graves, 299 U.S. 366 (1937); State ex rel. Wisconsin Trust Co. v.
Phelps, 172 Wis. 147, 176 N.V. 863 (1920).
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APPORTIONMENT OF FEDERAL AND STATE EsTATE TAXES

A difficult conflicts problem in the administration of taxable estates
is raised by the question of which beneficiaries must bear the burden
of the federal or state estate taxes. Under our system of law, the burden of federal tax is determined by state law. 22 2 In the absence of
testamentary directions the general common law view was to fund the
payment of estate taxes from the residue of the estate in the hands of
the executor in the same manner that other preferred debts of the
estate are handled. 223 This approach has been changed in about half
the states to provide that the estate taxes shall be apportioned among
the recipients of the assets that constitute the taxable estate. 224 Some
states have adopted this doctrine by decision, but most have adopted
it by statute. Florida has one of the typical statutes, 225 patterned after
the original New York law on the subject, though there is some authority indicating decisional adoption of the rule of apportionment in
Florida. 22 r To determine whether there is to be an apportionment
of taxes relating to testamentary dispositions, it is possible that many
states will follow tradition and apply the law of the decedent's domicile
to movables and the law of the situs to immovables. 2 7 The existing
cases, 228 however, all decided in New York, indicate that the law of
the decedent's domicile will be applied to determine apportionment
matters as to both movables and immovables.
Under existing tax structures many inter vivos transfers are subjected to the estate tax, and it is these transfers that cause the most
difficult problems. The significance of this matter is indicated by the
fact that, of the four litigated cases involving inter vivos trusts, three
have involved Florida estates. New York, in Matter of Gato,2 2 9 held
222Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
223Gelin v. Gelin, 229 Minn. 516, 40 N.W.2d 342 (1949); Turner v. Cole, 118 N.J.
Eq. 497, 179 At. 113 (Ct. Err. & App. 1935); see Sutter, Apportionment of the
Federal Estate Tax in the Absence of Statute or an Expression of Intention, 51
MicH. L. Rmv. 53 (1952).
224See Scoles, Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes and Conflict of Laws, 55
COLuM. L. Rv. 261 (1955).
225FLA. STAT. §734.041 (1955).
226Henderson v. Usher, 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846 (1936).
227Cf. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942); Scoles, supra note 224, at 291.
225sn re Peabody's Estate, 115 N.Y.S.2d 337 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Matter of Ruperti,
194 Misc. 376, 86 N.Y.S2d 887 (Surn. Ct. 1949); In re Bernie's Estate, 74 N.Y.S.2d
887 (Sur. Ct. 1947); In re Goodman's Estate, 66 N.Y.S.2d 706 (Surr. Ct. 1946);
In re Dommerich's Estate, 74 N.Y.S.2d 283 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
229276 App. Div. 651, 97 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1st Dep't 1950).
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that the domicile at death, that is, Florida, should govern the apportionment in regard to an inter vivos trust created and administered in
New York. Massachusetts, on the other hand, has held that the law governing the trust, that is, the place of creation and administration, and
not the settlor's domicile at death should govern. 230 Minnesota has
followed the Massachusetts view in denying application of the Florida
law to a trust administered in Minnesota that was created by a settlor
who later died domiciled in Florida. 231 The fourth case is an instance in which the matter appears not to have been appropriately
presented to the Michigan court.232 In refusing to apply the Florida

apportionment law against a Michigan trust, even though the settlor
died domiciled in Florida, the court did not indicate its awareness of
the conflict of laws problem presented. 23' This matter is of the utmost

concern to the domiciliary personal representative, since he must pay
the tax and enforce any available contribution if apportionment is
required. The personal representative may, of course, use his full
power of retention and set off, or he may sue to enforce contribution.
Nearly all of these problems are within the control of the draftsmen, because the matter of who is to bear the burden of the estate
tax is subject to the decedent's properly expressed intention. Therefore, every dispositive instrument should include an express provision
covering the impact of estate taxes. If the taxes are to be paid from
the residue this should be stated, and adequate funds should be provided for the purpose. If the testator desires the tax to be apportioned
this should also be stated, with an indication of which gifts are to
contribute and which, if any, are not. Reliance upon the statutory
presumption is not sufficient because of its possible limited application.
Particular attention should be paid to inter vivos dispositions. The
governing intention should be stated in both the will and the inter
vivos instrument to assure the desired result, without regard to the
conflicts attitude of the courts that might later pass on the question.
CONCLUSION
Much of what has been discussed indicates that most, though
perhaps not all, conflict of laws problems in estate planning can be
23

01saacson v. Boston Safe Dep. and Trust Co., 325 Mass. 469, 91 N.E.2d 334

(1950).

23lFirst Nat'l Bank v. First Trust Co., 242 Minn. 226, 64 N.W.2d 524 (1954).
232Knowles v. National Bank, 345 Mich. 671, 76 N.A.2d 813 (1956).
23aFor a recent discussion of the inter vivos trust cases see Note, Conflict of Laws
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avoided by careful planning and drafting. While most clients are not
willing to plan their lives to avoid all such problems, an ounce of
prevention is worth much more than many untested cures.
In meeting the complicated problems of the multi-state estate the
attorney must advise his client to locate assets in those states in which
desired dispositions are effective. He must bear in mind that there is
no substitute for a well-drafted instrument that satisfies the law of
all states having contact with it. Such instruments should make
liberal use of provisions indicating the owner's intention as to dispositive and administrative matters and as to the conflict of laws problems
that may arise. Since no estate owner or estate planner can foresee
future circumstances, the most valuable protection against the unexpected distortion of the estate plan is regular and frequent review of
the plan to accommodate the changed circumstances. This should
be done regardless of whether the estate is large or small, local or
interstate.

in Estate Tax Apportionment - The Inter Vivos Trust, 9 U. FLA. L. REV. 194 (1956).
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